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I.

INTRODUCTION

Every river system,
from its headwaters in the forest to its mouth on the coast,
is a single unit and should be treated as such.'

In the American West-as historians reported Will Rogers to say"whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting over." 2 If any place in
the West deserves the title of the O.K. Corral of water fights, it is

Colorado. With the headwaters of at least seven major rivers originating in
the heart of the Rocky Mountains, 3 Colorado is and has been the epicenter

of groundbreaking shifts in western water management, law, and policy.4
Colorado became the first state to formally adopt the prior appropriation
doctrine.5 Likewise, the state joined the first interstate water compact,
which apportioned the Colorado River among seven states and two
nations. 6 Along with several other progressive reforms,7 Colorado also

1. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, United States President, to the Inlands Waterways
Commission (1908), quoted in DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE
WATERSHED LEVEL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN THE EMERGING

ERA OF COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT A-15 (1997).

2. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Introduction to
CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW

TRADITION,

INNOVATION AND

at vii (Lawrence J. MacDonnell ed.,

1985).
3. These rivers include the Animas, the Arkansas, the Colorado, the Rio Grande, the
South Platte, the Yampa, and the San Juan. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Settle a New
Land: An HistoricalEssay on Water Law and Policy in the American West and in Colorado,
in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 1, 2 (David H. Getches ed., 1988).
4. Id.
5. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). The prior appropriation
system embodies three main rules: the first person in time to divert water is the first person
in right to use the water; the person must divert the water for a beneficial purpose as
defined by state law; and if the person does not use that water, he looses his right to use it.
See David H. Getches, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 75-76 (3d ed. 1997).
6. See generally David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 413 (1984).
7. For example, Colorado became one of the first states to conjunctively manage
groundwater and surface water. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (1973). Likewise,
Colorado law requires senior appropriators to take reasonable measures to improve their
irrigation methods to ensure the "optimum use" of water. See Alamosa-La Jara Water
Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983). See also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-501(2)(e) (1999).
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became one of the first states to recognize through legislation the need for
instream flow rights to protect aquatic ecosystems.'
In recent years, another potentially groundbreaking shift in western
water management has developed in the form of community-based
watershed initiatives, which are now in widespread use throughout the
West, including in Colorado. Community-based watershed initiatives
attempt to solve water management problems by encouraging greater
collaboration between regulating agencies and the members of the public
with a stake or interest in management decisions. Since 1994, the Animas
River Stakeholders Group ("Stakeholders Group") has conducted an
experiment with community-based watershed management in Southwestern
Colorado. The State of Colorado and several federal agencies 9 support this
effort with the hope that it might serve as a model for other communitybased watershed initiatives.'°
In many instances, advocates of community-based watershed initiatives
praise such efforts without applying much critical analysis to the
substantive progress, or lack thereof, of these groups. This lack of "honest
self-appraisal" has undermined the legitimacy of the growing communitybased watershed movement." This article will provide a critical analysis
of the Stakeholders Group's effectiveness at implementing a communitybased watershed management initiative in the Upper Animas River basin.
First, the article will explore water quality problems and their origins
in the Upper Animas River basin to provide a historical context for the
Second, it will discuss the traditional
Stakeholders Group's work.
regulatory system's shortcomings, which led to the Stakeholders Group's
creation. Third, the article will examine the broader community-based
watershed movement to describe the current array of praise and criticism
leveled against this new form of citizen participation in environmental
decision-making.
Last, the article will describe Stakeholders Group's progress and future
prospects. Many community-based watershed groups do not significantly
restore or improve the watersheds in their respective regions. Likewise,
the Stakeholders Group has made slow and limited progress at achieving
restoration in the Upper Animas basin. However, the Stakeholders
Group's mission is not at an end; thus, it still has an opportunity to be one
of the rare groups to fulfill the promise of community-based watershed
Given that possibility, the article recommends several
management.
changes to the current institutional structure that may allow the
Stakeholders Group, and other watershed groups, to play a more
meaningful role in achieving conservation strategies. If the Stakeholders

8. See Act of April 23, 1973, ch. 442, §1, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521, 1521
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999)).
9. The United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the
Interior continue to watch and to participate in this effort. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at
14.

10.
11.

Id.
See Douglas S. Kenney, Are Comnunity-Based Watershed Groups Really Effective?,
3 CHRON. OF COMMUNITY 33, 37 (1999).
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Group fails, its failure will not represent an indictment of the communitybased watershed movement; rather, it will represent a societal and
institutional failure to implement this worthy idea.
II.

POLLUTION IN THE SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: MINING'S
LEGACY

And when the throng of eager menMen of heroic mould and trueWrought mines that silver might be had
They builded better than they knewThese men now gone. 2
The Animas River 3 originates in the high San Juan Mountains just
above the historic mining town of Silverton, Colorado, in the Southwest
portion of the state. It is the largest remaining free-flowing river in the
dam-abundant West.' 4 The Animas River's water flows uninhibited nearly
100 miles south to its confluence with the San Juan River and ultimately
feeds into the Gulf of California by way of the Colorado River.15 In total,
the Animas River watershed pulsates through 700 square-miles of the heart
of the San Juan Mountain.

Driving south on U.S. 550 out of Ouray, Colorado, the San Juan
Mountains dominate the scenery with numerous, rugged, high-altitude

peaks. 16 The San Juans contain "hundreds of peaks over thirteen thousand
feet and nearly one fourth of all the peaks in North America over fourteen
thousand feet high."' 7 The sublimely scenic San Juan Mountains are the
byproduct of massive geologic forces that sculpted Southwestern Colorado
over the last 1.8 billion years. 18

12. Untitled Poem, SILVERTON STANDARD (Jan. 3, 1903), reprinted in Duane A. Smith,
The Miners: "They Builded Better Than They Knew," in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN
MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY 234, 245 (Rob Blair et al.
eds., 1996).
13. Spaniard settlers originally named the Animas River the El Rio de las Animas
Perdidas, which means "[t]he River of Lost Souls." See Rob Blair, Points of Interest Along
the San Juan Skyway, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY,
AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 254.
14. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm >.
15. The river's flow fluctuates between 400 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) in the fall and
5,000 c.f.s. in the spring. See Blair, supra note 13, at 254.
16. Red Mountain pass is a particularly impressive spectacle from the car seat. At
11,018 feet above sea level, Red Mountain pass is a massive outcropping of mineralized
rock that nearly glows red like a mountain on Mars.
17. ROBERT L. BROWN, AN EMPIRE OF SILVER 13 (1984).
18. See Douglas C. Brew, Paleotectonic History, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN
MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 18.
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Figure I. Upper Animas Watershed and locations of study arek.

A. A HISTORY OF SETTLEMENT IN THE SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS
The San Juans' mineral riches resulted from the collapse of an ancient
volcano that produced a large concave depression in the land, known as the
Silverton Caldera. 1 9 The volcano's collapse allowed "hot, acidic, mineralladen waters" to disperse through the land that now forms the San Juan
Mountains.20 This process left copious deposits of gold, silver, lead, zinc,
and copper. 21
Human occupation of the San Juans occurred recently in geologic time.
The region's earliest known inhabitants began living there about 12,000
years ago. 2 There is little evidence that the native peoples who first
19.

See Scott Fetchenhier, Ore Deposits and Minerals, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN

MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY 80, 80-81 (Rob Blair et al.

eds., 1996).
20. Id. at 81.
21. Miners unearthed these minerals from some of Colorado's most famous mines
including the Sunnyside Mine, the Camp Bird Mine, and the Idarado Mine. Id. at 80.
22. The Anasazi or the Ancestral Puebloans are the earliest known inhabitants of the
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inhabited the San Juans ever knew about, or valued, the mineral riches
beneath their feet before the arrival of Europeans.23
In 1765, the first European, Spaniard Don Juan Maria de Rivera,
explored the San Juans.24 The wave of Spanish explorers who followed
Rivera never discovered the copious mineral wealth within the San Juan
mountains. 5 It wasn't until 1860 that Captain Charles Baker discovered
gold in the Upper Animas basin, triggering the first boom and bust cycle of
European settlement.26

By the summer of 1861, "several hundred [white] men were en route

to the San Juans. '' 27 After enduring the long, treacherous trail to Baker's
camp, the gold rushers were not welcomed by the local Ute Indians, who at
the time held treaty rights to the area. 28 By the summer's end, the San
Juans' extreme elevation and the lackluster initial findings convinced most
fortune seekers to return home. Critics called Captain Baker "almost a
lunatic" for his promotion of the area.29

Anglo settlers returned to the area, however. By the 1870's, with the
American Civil War resolved, anxious miners demonstrated a renewed
interest in the exclusive use and possession of the San Juans.30 In
response, the United States government negotiated the unscrupulous Brunot
Agreement with the Utes in 1873, which removed the heart of mining
country in the San Juans from Indian control. 31 Additionally, the first
railroad's arrival in Silverton in 1882 signaled the end of all major barriers
to white settlement of the Upper Animas basin.32
The town of Silverton lies in the heart of San Juan County and takes its
name from the abundant silver deposits in the surrounding area. 33 Thirty
mills and two smelters had been built in and around Silverton by the turn

Four Corners Region.

See CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND
ENDURANCE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 262 (1999). Since the 1200's, the Ute, Apache,

and Navajo Indian Tribes also inhabited the region. Id. at 258.
23. See Smith, supra note 12, at 234.
24. See BROWN, supra note 17, at 17.
25. See Richard N. Ellis, The Spanish, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR
GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 215-18; see also Smith,
supra note 12, at 234-35.
26. S.B. Kellogg and Company paid for Baker's exploration of the San Juans. BROWN,
supra note 17, at 18. The Upper Animas basin occupies approximately 200 square-miles
beginning at the Animas River's headwaters at Animas Forks and extends a few miles south
of Silverton, Colorado. See supra fig. 1.
27. BROWN, supra note 17, at 19.
28. See Smith, supra note 12, at 236-37.
29. BROWN, supra note 17, at 19.
30. See id. at 59-60.
31. See Smith, supra note 12, at 237. Historians have called the Brunot Agreement
"blatantly fraudulent" in that government made the Utes believe they were ceding the
mines, not the underlying land. See also Ellis, supra note 25, at 229. See generally
WILKINSON, supra note 22, at ch. 7.
32. See Smith, supra note 12, at 238-39.
33. Silverton was originally named Baker's Park after Captain Baker's mining camp.
Legend dictates that the name Silverton came from a local miner who said "[w]e may not
have much gold, but we've got silver by the ton." See Blair, supra note 13, at 275.
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of the century.34 Mining reached its apex between 1900 and 1912, when
the population of San Juan County peaked at an all-time-high of 5,000
people. 3

The Upper Animas basin continued to steadily produce silver, zinc,
and other valuable minerals throughout the twentieth century.36 However,

of the hundreds of mines in the area, only about a dozen brought profits to
the owners."

Most mining took place near the three main tributaries of the

Upper Animas basin-the Upper Animas River, Cement Creek, and
Mineral Creek. The area's last major mine, the Sunnyside Mine, near
Cement Creek's headwaters, closed down in 1991.38

B. MINING POLLUTION IN THE UPPER ANIMAS BASIN
By 2001, San Juan County expects to have a population of fewer than

500 people.39 The town of Silverton remains cluttered with mining era
relics that draw hordes of tourists who support the local economy.4° Other
than tourist nostalgia for the "old west,"'" it appears mining's only lasting
legacy in the Upper Animas basin will be pollution.
Until 1934, most mining operations around Silverton dumped their
mine wastes directly into the Animas River.42 Other mining companies

continued this practice well into the 1970s.4 3 Over-grazing of cattle and
34. See Silverton Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Out & About (last modified Feb. 11,
2000)
< http://www.silverton.org/about.html >.
35. See id.
36. See Smith, supra note 12, at 242.
37. See Electra Draper, Silverton at the Heart of Reclamation Project: Old Mining
Operations Left Cleanup Legacy Along Animas River, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Oct.
20, 1996, at A14.
38. Id. The closing resulted in job loss and overall population reduction. Currently,
San Juan County has one of the highest numbers of people with doctorate degrees of any
county in Colorado. In addition, observers have connected the difficulty of making a living
in the area with the area's serious problems with domestic violence. Telephone Interview
with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (Apr. 28, 1999).
39. See Silverton Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Relocation (visited Feb. 11, 2000)
< http://www.silverton.org/relocation/population.html >.
40. On Silverton's one paved road stands the town's main attraction-the San Juan
County Historical Society Museum, better known as the mining museum. See Silverton
Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Visitor's Events & Attractions (last modified Dec. 31,
1998) <http://www.silverton.org/visitors.html>.
Many attractions focus on mining
activities: touring gold mills, touring gold mines, and panning for gold. Id. Likewise,
buildings in town reflect mining's influence, including the Miner's Union Hotel, the
Miner's Union Hospital, as well as a variety of mining memorabilia shops. A good
demonstration of the battles over environmental pollution in the basin, at least one bumper
sticker in town reads: "Eat an Environmentalist."
41. The term "Old West" is really a commercialized concept that fits fictitious
stereotypes and distorts historical reality. See Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Shadows of
Heaven Itself, in ATLAS OF THE NEW WEST: PORTRAIT OF A CHANGING REGION 151, 154-55
(William E. Riebsame et al. eds., 1997).
42. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 6, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa0l .htm>.
43. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River Stakeholders
Group (Apr. 12, 1999).
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sheep caused further water quality degradation in the watershed." Today,
an estimated 2,000 abandoned and inactive mines continue to leak acid
mine drainage into the watershed. 45 As a result, scientists have called the
Upper Animas basin the most severely mining-impacted watershed in
America.46
The San Juan Mountains contain high concentrations of sulfur
interspersed with valuable mineral deposits.47 When locked in the ground,
these sulfur-laden rocks are essentially harmless to the surrounding

ecosystem.

However, the process of mining creates waste rock piles

known as tailings, which contain sulfur. When rainwater falls on waste
rock, it combines with air and sulfur to produce
sulfuric acid, a product
48
referred to as acid mine drainage ("AMD").
When AMD flushes into rivers, such as the Upper Animas River, it
causes significant damage to aquatic life. 49 AMD from a single site can
continue to disrupt the natural ecology of a riparian area for thousands of
years.50 Unfortunately, untreated AMD can also jeopardize human health5
and water supplies due to high concentrations of various toxic metals.52

As a result of mining and other natural sources of acid runoff, " the
44. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>.

45. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. See also KENNEY, supra
note 1, at 11-12.
46. In addition, if the currently postponed Animas-La Plata dam project is ever built,
massive additional impacts may occur on the Animas River. The prospect of the AnimasLa Plata project being built led one organization to call the Animas River one of the
Nation's most endangered and threatened rivers. See Four Southwest Rivers Named Among
Nation's Most Endangered and Threatened Rivers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 16, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 5712057; see Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
47. See Preston Somers & Lisa Floyd-Hanna, Wetlands, Riparian Habitats, and Rivers,
in

THE WESTERN

SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS:

THEIR GEOLOGY,

ECOLOGY,

AND HUMAN

supra note 12, at 182.
48. Id.

HISTORY,

49. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING
TIlE FUTURE OF THE WEST 49-50 (1992).

THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND

50. See Colorado School of Mines, AMD Chemistry, Environmental Chemistry in
Colorado, Toxic Mine Drainage Chemistry and Treatment (visited Feb. 11,
2000)
< http://www.mines.edu/fshome/jhoran/ch 126/amd.htm >.
51. See Paul Stokstad, Structuring a Reclamation Program for Abandoned Noncoal
Mines, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 121, 128 (1998). In addition to the hazards of AMD, mines emit
toxic gases. At least sixteen poorly informed adventurers have died in Colorado in the last
fifty years by wandering into inactive mines and inhaling the toxic gases that are present in
the abandoned mine shafts.
52. These toxic metals include lead, arsenic, and zinc. See Colorado School of Mines,
AMD Chemistry, Environmental Chemistry in Colorado, Toxic Mine Drainage Chemistry
and
Treatment
(visited
Feb.
11,
2000)
< http://www.mines.edu/fshome/jhoran/chl26/amd.htm >.
53. Acid drainage also occurs when natural processes expose sulfur-laden rocks to air
and to water. This process, known as acid rock drainage, contributes to the water quality
degradation in some areas of the Upper Animas basin. See U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY,
NATURAL AND MINING-RELATED SOURCES OF DISSOLVED MINERALS DURING Low FLOW IN
THE UPPER ANIMAs RIVER BASIN, SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO 29 (Oct. 1977). The presence

of substantial amounts of acid rock drainage has led some commentators to suggest that the
focus on mining pollution alone reflects modern humans' inability to deal comprehensively
with these types of problems. See generally Robert Frodeman, A Sense of the Whole:
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upper Animas basin is devoid of significant aquatic life.54 Stream segments
in the basin run yellow to orange from the AMD. The banks of Cement
Creek are stained bright orange and bear an unsettling resemblance to the
lips of a child after drinking too much Kool-Aid. However, due to the
contribution of water from several cleaner tributaries south of Silverton,

the Animas River below Durango is well-known for its excellent trout
habitat."
Mining pollution is not unique to the Animas River. In Colorado,
nearly 1,300 river miles56 suffer from contamination attributable to an
estimated 22,000 abandoned mines.57 Nationwide, more than 12,000 miles

of American rivers and streams and 180,000 acres of lakes and reservoirs
have been polluted by approximately 557,000 abandoned hardrock mine
sites. 58TIn ttl
total, mining activities in the United States have deposited
around 50 billion tons of waste rock and other wastes as a monument to the
"goldrush lust" sanctioned by the General Mining Law of 1872.' 9 The
estimated national clean-up cost for the abandoned mining sites lies
somewhere between $32 billion and $72 billion.'
III.

REGULATORY RESPONSES TO POLLUTION IN THE ANIMAS
RIVER

[Firagmentationof institutionsis inevitable
in a Nation that embraces decentralizedgovernment and diffused power
that encourages individuals, interest groups, and even agencies
to pursue different objectives
derivative of distinct ideologicalperspectives and self-interests.6'
Until the 1970's, neither government nor miners knew of or
understood the negative effects of AMD. 62 As a result, almost no state or
Toward an Understandingof Acid Mine Drainage in the West, in EARTH MATTERS: THE
119 (Robert Frodeman
ed., 2000).
54. Upstream from Silverton, Colorado, some microinvertibrates, insects, rainbow
trout, and brook trout still exist. See Somers & Floyd-Hanna, supra note 47, at 187.
55. See id. at 185-86.
56. See WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 49.
57. WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, CLEANING UP ABANDONED MINES: A WESTERN
PARTNERSHIP 4 (1998). It should be noted that more than 80 percent of abandoned mine
sites create little or no environmental or public health dangers. Id. at 5, 7. In Colorado,
while the state safeguarded nearly 5,000 abandoned mine openings, it has reclaimed only
approximately 1,500 acres of abandoned mine land under the Inactive Mine Reclamation
Program. See Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board, Colorado'sMinerals & Geology,
Abandoned Mines, Inactive Mine Reclamation Program (visited Feb. 11, 2000)
< http://www.dnr.state.co.us/geology/inactivemine.html >.
58. See Mineral Policy Center, EnvironmentalImpacts, Mining's EnvironmentalImpacts
(visited on Feb. 11, 2000) < http://www.mineralpolicy.org/Environment.html >.
59. Refer to the following source for an excellent discussion of the General Mining Law
of 1872. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 49.
60. See Frodeman, supra note 53, at 121 & n.4.
61. KENNEY, supra note 1, at A-39.
62. See Burt Hubbard, Gold Rush Hangover: Coalition Tackles Breckenridge Mining
EARTH SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY
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federal laws regulated mining waste throughout the twentieth century.6 3
The one potential avenue for the control of AMD pollution before the

1970s was common law nuisance suits. 4 However, nuisance suits were
brought only infrequently to address problems from AMD and were rarely
brought by average individuals.65
By the 1970's, the federal government began passing bold new laws
dealing with environmental problems. 6 Unfortunately, these laws only
indirectly dealt with AMD; 6? therefore, as currently formulated, federal
and state laws fail to address adequately the complex water quality

problems attributable to abandoned mines and to AMD.
A. FEDERAL PROGRAMS DEALING WITH ACID MINE DRAINAGE
Some federal laws can potentially deal with AMD, including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") and the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
These laws are
ineffective for the reasons discussed below.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 69 in 1980 "in response to
increasing concern over the severe environmental and public health effects
from improper disposal of hazardous waste and other hazardous
substances. ' 70 The law has two primary purposes. First, it gives "the
federal government the means to effectively control the spread of

hazardous materials from inactive and abandoned waste disposal sites ....
Second, it ...

affix[es] the ultimate cost of cleaning up these disposal sites

Pollution, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Feb. 9, 1998, at A10.
63. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
64. Nuisance suits have their foundations in English common law. Private individuals
can still bring these suits to abate nuisances associated with pollution. See Caroline
Henrich, Acid Mine Drainage: Conunon Law, SMCRA, and the Clean Water Act, 10 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 235, 236-39 (1995).
65. Id.
66. These laws include but are not limited to the Clean Water Act at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (1994); the Clean Air Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994); the National Environmental Policy Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994); the National
Forest Management Act at 16 U.S.C. § 471-498 (1994); the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994); and the National Historic Preservation
Act at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1994).
67. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, BARRIERS AND INCENTIVES TO
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP OF ABANDONED HARDROCK MINE SITES 5-9 (1998).
68. See Alison Barry, Mining and Water Quality Under the Clean Water Act, COLO.
LAW., Sept. 1996, at 93, 98.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
70. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D. Utah
1986).
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7
to the parties responsible for the contamination." '

CERCLA is commonly known as "Superfund," due to a provision that
establishes a trust fund that pays the costs associated with the clean-up of
certain contaminated sites designated by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") as national priorities.72 At these sites, the EPA has the
authority to take direct remedial actions funded by the Superfund. 73 In

addition, the federal government can sue responsible parties to recover the
clean-up costs.74
The EPA regulates AMD under CERCLA. 75 The agency has used the

Superfund to clean up a few of the Nation's worst hardrock mines, such as
the Summitville Mine in the Eastern San Juan Mountains. 76

However,

barriers, such as the corporate form, have prevented the federal
government from recovering the clean up costs from the responsible parties
at many abandoned mine sites.77 In addition, financial barriers have
restricted Superfund designation. Currently, the EPA maintains seventeen
Colorado sites on the Superfund list. At these sites, clean up efforts have
already exceeded $4 billion dollars, "with the final bill expected to reach

$12 billion. '78
EPA has considered, and continues to consider, declaring the Upper
Animas basin a Superfund site if Colorado fails to act. 79 The state
government, local governments, and private representatives in the Upper
Animas basin generally oppose this designation for fear that an' EPAimposed solution would cost too much, both socially and economically. 8 °

71. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340
(9th Cir. 1992).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a), (c) (1994). EPA has primary authority to implement the
act pursuant to an executive order. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
73. Congress authorized the EPA to act if there is a "release" or substantial threat of
release of a hazardous substance from a "facility." A "release" is defined broadly to
include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dum.ing, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. §
9601(9) (1994). "Facility" is also broadly defined to include "any site or area where a
hazardous substance has ... come to be located." Id. § 9601(22).
74. See id. § 9607(a).
75. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (E.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that whether AMD was a hazardous substance regulated by CERCLA was
an issue of material fact). See also Barry, supra note 68, at 93.
76. Luke J. Danielson, et al., The Summitville Story: A Superfund Site is Born, 24
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,388, 10,388 (1994). Only fifty-two abandoned mine sites currently
occupy CERCLA's National Priority List. See Stokstad, supra note 51, at 134.
77. See Danielson, et al., supra note 76, at 10,398.
78. See Burt Hubbard, Superfund May Tackle Supermess, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver),
Apr. 6, 1998, at A4. Sixty percent of Superfund costs arise from litigation.
79. See id. at A12. See also Animas River Stakeholders Group, Animas River
Stakeholders Group, Meeting Summary, November 19, 1998 (visited May 12, 1999)
< http://www.waterinfo.org/Stakeholders Group/mtgsummary.html >.
80. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. Under CERCLA, the EPA
can recover costs from potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"). PRPs include present and
past operators and owners, persons who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances, and
persons who transported hazardous substances to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). If
EPA enforced this rule to the letter in the Upper Animas basin, the costs of cleanup could
fall on many small landowners not responsible for the pollution.
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They point to Summitville residents' unproductive experience as proof that

the Superfund process is contentious and dismissive of local concerns. 8

Most of the basin's abandoned mines are located on land currently
owned by parties who did not cause the mining pollution that still exists
there. 82 While the EPA could hold current owners liable for clean up
under state and federal law, most owners are judgment-proof due to their
lack of financial resources. 3 However, the EPA believes that it could
trace some of the pollution to corporations that still exist in order to
recover some clean up costs. 84 The EPA's inability or failure to do so

results in the federal government's bearing the burden of costs not
recovered from responsible parties.85 Based on these financial barriers,
state and local interests recently succeeded in getting the EPA Region VIII

Administrator to promise not to list the Upper Animas basin as a Superfund
site until Colorado has had an opportunity to address the problem.86
2. Clean Water Act
In 1972, the federal government enacted what is now commonly

referred to as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 8 7 The goal of the CWA is to
make the waters of the United States fishable and swimmable by limiting
the discharge of pollutants into these waters.88 Unfortunately, the CWA
81. At Summitville, Colorado, a Latino community-based group wanted to participate in
the Superfund process. However, the state and federal government denied them the
opportunity. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, Southwest Circuit Rider for Mineral
Policy Center (Apr. 12, 1999). Yet, local communities do not always oppose Superfund.
In Clear Creek, Colorado, the community-based watershed group welcomed the Superfund
listing as a way to obtain additional funds to support remediation work. Telephone
Interview with Doug Kenney, Research Associate for Natural Resources Law Center (May
12, 1999).
82. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
83. Provisions of the CWA allow the state to force landowners to obtain national
pollution discharge elimination system permits for the abandoned mines located on their
land. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). However, given that these mines do not
produce a revenue stream, and given that taking this action would be politically unpopular,
the state has refrained from this course of action. See Telephone Interview with Greg
Parsons, Watershed Section Manager for Colorado Water Quality Control Division
(Apr.14, 1999).
Under CERCLA, there is retroactive strict liability for potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs"). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (establishing who constitutes
PRPs); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 460, 466-67 (D.
N.J. 1998) (dictum stating that CERCLA section 107 imposes strict liability on PRPs);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 220 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(concluding that CERCLA's applies retroactively and its retroactivity meets the threshold
for facial constitutional validity).
84. See Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
85. See generally Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1524-25, 1530 (1986).
86. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Aninas River Stakeholders Group, Meeting
Summary,
November
19,
1998
(visited
May
12,
1999)
< http://www.waterinfo.org/Stakeholders Group/mtgsummary.html >.
87. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
88. See id. § 1251(a)(1)-(2). Twenty-seven years after the enactment of the CWA,
"[fjorty percent of rivers, lakes, and estuaries in the United States are too polluted for these
basic uses. Furthermore, drinking water systems serving twenty percent of the U.S.
population are in violation of health based requirements." See Dianne K. Conway, TMDL
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only partially and indirectly regulates AMD problems. For the most part,
the CWA, like CERCLA, has proven to be an ineffective means for
dealing with problems associated with AMD.
a.

Setting Water Quality Standards

The CWA allows each state to set its own water quality standards,
which the EPA must approve.89 To begin this process, the states must set
"use designations" for major rivers and tributaries.' The CWA requires

states to attain as many uses as possible for each river segment for
activities such as water supply, industrial uses, recreation, and fish and
wildlife habitat.9" These use designations serve as the baseline by which

agencies set and revise water quality standards on a triennial basis.'
Two methods for setting water quality standards exist: narrative and
numerical.

Narrative standards do not provide any specific quantifiable

pollution limitations for specific river segments.

Rather, they simply

explain with descriptive words that each river shall attain various uses.93

Consequently, states can create narrative standards as unimposing as
requiring "the maintenance of present stream conditions."'
In contrast, numerical standards define specific concentrations of
pollutants that may be present in a river segment while maintaining the
segment's use designations.95 Thus, numerical standards can require
stringent and affirmative pollution control measures, while narrative
standards generally do not.' States enforce these water quality standards
on particular river segments by requiring point source and nonpoint source
polluters 97 to alter their behavior according to the promulgated standards.9 8

Litigation:So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 83-84 (1997).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(b) (1994).
90. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(a) (1999).
91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994).
92. Id. § 1313a.
93. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons From the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 211 (1999).
94. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manager for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (May 3, 1999).
95. See Adler, supra note 93, at 211 & n.46. When a state lacks detailed pollution data
for a specific river segment, it will often use the EPA's Gold Book to set numerical
standards. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38. The Gold Book
contains standardized information on the levels of various pollutants allowable to achieve
desired use designations, such as aquatic habitat. Id. However, aquatic life in areas with
high levels of naturally mineralized waters, such as the Animas River, will often adapt to
above average concentrations of these toxins. In tiese places, the Gold Book may overlyrestrict the protection of certain uses and thus be overly-burdensome on regulated polluters.
See also COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 6.
96. See Adler, supra note 93, at 211.
97. Point source pollutants come from a pipe, culvert, or similar conveyance while
nonpoint source pollutants come from diffused sources such as agricultural runoff. Drew
Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,574, 10,575 (1997).
98. Id. at 10,582 & n.115.
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b. Regulating Point Sources
While the CWA does not directly regulate AMD, it does prohibit the

discharge of pollution into the United States' waters without a national
pollutant discharge elimination system permit ("NPDES permit"). 99 The
EPA requires NPDES permits when a person discharges"° pollution into

the navigable waters'0 ' from a point source such as a pipe or culvert.

Commentators have credited the regulation of point sources with02 the
majority of the pollution reduction that has occurred under the CWA. 1
CWA regulations and judicial precedents considered AMD a pollutant

under the CWA and usually considered mines point sources. 03 New or
active mines almost always must obtain NPDES permits.

However, in

places like the Upper Animas basin where no abandoned mines have
discharge permits, the point source regulation of mining waste is largely
ineffective. " For example, in the Upper Animas basin, only three
landowners hold NPDES permits under the CWA.' °5
Even if the

government closed these three sources, the basin would remain polluted by
2,000 other abandoned mine sites.
Some states have chosen to tighten regulation on point sources rather°6
than address nonpoint source pollution such as abandoned mines.'
Focusing on point sources alone will not help to clean up watersheds in
many areas of the country. Experts estimate that nonpoint source pollution

causes ninety-nine percent of sediment, eighty-eight percent of nitrates, and
eighty-four percent of phosphates in the United States' waters. 107
c. Regulating Nonpoint Sources
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to address nonpoint source
pollution. However, those amendments failed to fix the AMD problem.
Under the revisions, the CWA requires states to regulate diffuse and
disparate sources of pollution, known as nonpoint sources. 0 8 States must
99. See33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1994).
100. See id. § 1362(12).
101. See id. § 1362(7). Courts have interpreted the words "navigable waters" to include
riparian zones or areas where water either collects or drains. United States v. Phelps
Dodge Corp. 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975).
102. Caputo, supra note 97, at 10,575.
103. See Barry, supra note 68, at 93, 95. New or active mines are considered point
sources subject to regulation under the CWA. Id. at 96. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL.
MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 7.
While states have authority to impose permit
requirements on landowners who own abandoned mines on their land, they generally avoid
that solution due to enforcement costs and other factors. Id.
104. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
105. Permit holders include the Sunnyside Gold Corporation, the Silverton wastewater
treatment facility, and the Pride of the West Mill, which is the only operative floatation mill
in the basin. However, the mill, which extracts base and precious metals from mining rock,
is inactive. Id.
106. See Conway, supra note 88, at 106.
107. See id. at 87.
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). Nonpoint source pollution comes primarily from
agriculture, silviculture, mining, construction, and urban sewage runoff. See id. §
1288(b)(2)(F)-(K).
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first identify nonpoint sources of pollution and then devise strategies to
control them by using best management practices." ° Next, states must
develop a total maximum daily load ("TMDL") of pollutants that each

river segment can absorb without violating the water quality standards.'
Finally, states must adopt a "continuing planning process," which explains
the states' procedures to achieve water quality standards.'
Unfortunately, the CWA only encourages states to attain the designated

water quality standards using nonpoint source regulation "to the maximum
extent possible."

112

Thus, the CWA does not contain any enforceable

obligation on the part of states to link their nonpoint source regulation to

States can choose to
the attainment of water quality standards." 3
with water quality
to
comply
sources
point
exclusively regulate
4
to impose reductions
the
authority
lacks
the
EPA
addition,
standards." In

of nonpoint source pollution if a state fails to do so. 1 5 Thus, because state
or EPA control of nonpoint source pollution is not mandatory" 6 or
universal under the CWA, it has been ineffective.

Congress considered abandoned mines a type of nonpoint source that

states should address in under their TMDL programs." 7 However, states
reluctantly impose the non-obligatory TMDL program on financially

vulnerable people, such as small landowners with abandoned mines on

their property." 8 Likewise, the EPA has been unwilling to force states to

implement TMDL programs through a more rigorous interpretation of the
CWA." 9 Instead, the EPA has turned to a community-based watershed
approach to develop TMDL programs on a consensus basis.' 20

Environmental groups have sued the EPA to force states to establish
TMDLs.

121

As a result of these lawsuits, the EPA must promulgate

109. Best management practices mean "[miethods, measures or practices selected by an
agency to meet its nonpoint source control needs," which "can be applied before, during
and after pollution-producing activities to reduce or eliminate the introduction of pollutants
into receiving waters." 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(m) (1997). See also Conway, supra note 88, at
87.
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
111. See id. § 1313(e)(3).
112. See id. § 1329(b)(4).
113. See Adler, supra note 93, at 220 & n.108.
114. See id. at 264. See also Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1528
(9th Cir. 1995) (upholding this one sided approach).
115. See Adler, supra note 93, at 228.
116. Id.
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(2)(G)(i)-(ii) (1994).
118. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, Watershed Section Manager for Colorado
Water Quality Control Division (Mar. 15, 1999).
119. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973, 995 (1995).
120. See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Total Maximum Daily Load
Program, Draft TMDL Program Implementation Strategy, Executive Summary (last
modified Feb. 12, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/strategy/execsum.html>.
121. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California (Newport Bay), Delaware,
Georgia, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See Lee A. DeHihns III,
Suits Over Water Quality Spark Action: Challenges to EPA's Failure to Establish 'Total
Maximum Daily Loads' for States Have Prompted New Policy and Renewed Activity,
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TMDLs in nine states, unless the states set these standards first. In
addition, similar lawsuits are pending or impending against the 22EPA on the
same issue in eighteen other jurisdictions, including Colorado. 1

It remains questionable whether merely requiring a state or the EPA to
develop a TMDL program will actually facilitate a reduction in nonpoint
sources of pollution. With neither mandatory language in the CWA nor an
EPA regulation strictly interpreting the CWA, the TMDL program will
continue to fail. Conversely, if the EPA or Congress changes the TMDL

program to force reductions in nonpoint sources, the program
23 could
emerge as a major regulatory tool to address problems like AMD. 1
These CWA provisions continue as the driving force behind the
attempts of the responsible agencies in Colorado to regulate AMD in the

Upper Animas basin. However, Colorado eventually concluded that the

CWA alone cannot deal with the AMD problems in the basin. For the
reasons set out below, Colorado has settled on an alternative approach of
addressing the mining waste in the Upper Animas basin.
B. COLORADO'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWA IN THE UPPER
ANIMAS BASIN

In Colorado, the Mined Land Reclamation Board and the Office of

Mined Land Reclamation 124 regulate active mines under the authority of the
Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act.125 However, only one mine
causing water quality problems in the Upper Animas basin is still active.
Colorado does not have a comprehensive state legislative or regulatory
program for abandoned mines.' 26 Therefore, the state must deal with these
problems indirectly through the CWA. 27
In Colorado, the Water Quality Control Commission ("Commission")
implements the CWA by "sett[ing] water quality standards and issu[ing]
regulations for all surface and groundwater in the state." 128 The

Commission, which is comprised of citizens appointed by the Governor of
Colorado, sets standards based on suggestions from the public and on
NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 16, 1998, at B12.
122. See id. These states include Alabama, California (Los Angeles), Colorado, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. "In
no other environmental regulatory area has so much of litigation erupted over a single
program." Id.
123. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 8.
124. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-105(1) (1999).
125. See id. §§ 34-32-101 to -127.
126. The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board does have an Inactive Mine
Reclamation Program that receives "fund[ing] entirely through the Department of the
Interior by reclamation fees paid by current coal mining operations." See Colorado Mined
Land Reclamation Board, Colorado's Minerals & Geology, Abandoned Mines, Inactive
Mine
Reclamation
Program
(visited
Feb.
12,
2000)
<http://www.dnr.state.co.us/geology/inactivemine.html>.
However, because the
program has minimal funding, it has only reclaimed 1,500 acres. Id.
127. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
128. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Helping Communities Protect Rivers (visited Apr. 10,
1999) <http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>.
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recommendations and studies of the professionals at the Water Quality
Control Division ("Division"). Both the Commission and the Division are
subdivisions of the Colorado Department of Public Health and the
Environment.
The Commission first promulgated use classifications and water quality
standards for the Animas basin in 1979.129 At that time, the Division
concluded that few fish species lived in the Upper Animas River's main
that did
tributaries. Therefore, the Commission set water quality standards
130
not require meaningful clean up of the Upper Animas basin.
Throughout the 1980's, the Upper Animas basin's water quality
standards remained the same; the state took little initiative to address the
mining pollution in the region."' However, by the decade's end, local
citizens successfully reintroduced a small population of reproducing trout
the
into the Upper Animas River.' 32 As a result of this reintroduction,
33
Division began to rethink the basin's use classifications. 1
From 1991 to 1993, the Division performed extensive "chemical,
biological, and physical" studies of the Upper Animas River to determine
"the potential for water quality improvement sufficient to allow naturally
reproducing trout populations.' ' 134 The study sought to prioritize the
estimated 1,500 abandoned mining sites on the Animas River's various
state, local,
tributaries above Silverton for clean up. 3 ' Numerous federal,
36
and private interests cooperated or assisted with the study. 1
As a result of the study, the Division confirmed that serious levels of
contamination plagued the river. The Division attributed the pollution to a
variety of heavy metals that resulted from a combination of historical
mining operations and from naturally high background levels of these
pollutants.'37 Based on this information and on consultation with local
water
citizens through public meetings, the Commission determined that
38
quality in the Upper Animas basin "can and should be improved.'

129. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, ANIMAS RIVER COLLABORATIVE WATERSHED
PROJECT: 1995 STATUS REPORT 35 (1996).
130. Id.
131. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. Basically, the state decided to
deal with more manageable problems occurring in other watersheds. The state saw the
Upper Animas basin as too difficult a problem to deal with at the time. Id.
132. Id. See infra Part V.C.1.
133. The state is required to attain the best water quality possible in each river segment.
Thus, when the small trout population began to reproduce in the Upper Animas basin, it
became obvious that the state's water quality standards were insufficient under the CWA.
Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
134. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(A) (1997).
135. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33; 5 COLO. CODE
Prioritization was based on relative "loading,
REGS. § 1002-34.23(A)(1997).
environmental impact, feasibility, cost, and benefits." Id.
136. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(A)(1997).
137. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGIC SURVEY, supra note 53, at 30. For example, in the
Middle Fork Mineral Creek, natural sources contributed to 33 percent of the heavy metal
concentrations, while mining sources contributed to 67 percent. Id. The metal pollutants
include but are not limited to zinc, copper, iron, aluminum, iron, and cadmium. See

supra note 129, at 35.
See 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(B)(1997).

COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT,

138.
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However, the Commission found that "[t]he imposition of effluent
limits required under the Federal [Clean Water] Act for point sources and
cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint
sources are not likely to lead to the establishment of aquatic life in these
segments [of the Upper Animas basin]."' 3 9 In addition, the broad
distribution of pollution sources from abandoned mines, the potential
complexity of the clean up effort, and the large number of affected
landowners convinced the Commission that it needed to formulate a
collaborative solution derived from a community-based process. 140
C. CREATION OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

To facilitate the creation of a community-based collaborative process in
the Upper Animas basin, the Division turned to the Colorado Center for
Environmental Management ("Center").14 ' Former Colorado Governor
Roy Romer created the non-profit Center to seek pragmatic alternatives to
environmental management problems. 142 The Center's first project was to
develop a model of collaborative environmental management under a grant
from the United States Department of Energy ("DOE"). 143 The Center, at
the request of the Division and with the approval of the DOE, agreed 144
to
demonstrate the usefulness of this model in the Upper Animas River.
The Center's efforts resulted in the formation of the Animas River
Stakeholders Group in early 1994.14
Before discussing the details of the Stakeholders Group's activities and
progress, it is necessary to view the group in relation to the watershed
movement in general. The following explanation discusses academic
support and criticism of the idea of community-based watershed
management. As the following section demonstrates, the Stakeholders
Group remains both typical and atypical of conventional community-based
watershed groups.
IV.

THE WATERSHED MOVEMENT: POWELL'S PROPHECY
FULFILLED

This, then, is the proposition I make:
that the entire arid region be organized into natural hydrographic
districts ....
The plan is to establish self-government by hydrographicbasins.4 6

139. See id.
140. See generally id.
141. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33.
142. Id. at Forward.
143. Id. at 38.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 33.
146. See J. W. Powell, Institutionsfor the Arid Lands, THE CENTURY, 111, 114 (MayOct. 1890). The arid region John Wesley Powell referred to is the American West where
hydrographic districts are synonymous with watersheds. Id. at 111.
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To those familiar with the history of Anglo-American settlement in the
arid Southwestern United States, John Wesley Powell is many things-an
explorer, a geographer, a geologist, an ethnographer, a bureaucrat, a failed
politician, and, to some, a visionary. Historians often credit the one-armed
Civil War veteran with first recognizing the American West's need for

coordinated management of water resources based on hydrographic
boundaries or watersheds.' 47 To the detriment of western watersheds,
western politicians' and profiteers' pro-expansion
fervor jeered Powell's
148
revolutionary ideas off of the public stage.

From 1890 to 1980, various legislative and government agency
initiatives considered the concept of coordinated governmental watershed
management,
implemented with meaningful citizen participation.
However, the government never actually acted on these ideas.1 49 Instead,
Congress divided the responsibility for water management among nearly
forty federal agencies in addition to the state and local agencies with
similar responsibilities.' 50 According to one commentator, this
fragmentation of management responsibility resulted in the production of
"management anarchy" in the West's water resources field.''

While the major environmental laws and amendments of the 1970s and
the 1980s significantly improved the Nation's water quality in some

respects, these same laws have serious flaws that render them impotent in
certain contexts.' 52 In the 1980s, a political movement developed favoring
smaller government and federal devolution of power and responsibility to
state and local entities. This trend helped to create a climate where local

control over watershed management gained renewed attention and

147.

See

KENNEY,

supra note 1, at A-13. Mormons' and Hispanics' communal water

systems heavily influenced Powell's ideas for watershed management. Id.
148. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN
WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (1954). Powell espoused many

influential ideas. See generally JOHN WESLEY

POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID

REGION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH

(Wallace Stegner, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1879).
149. Regional water resource management has a history in the American West.
generally KENNEY, supra note 1, at app. A.

See

150. Id. These agencies include, but are not limited to, the Environmental Protection
Agency , the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation,
the Corps of Engineers, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and the Bureau of

Indian Affairs. Id. Further, more than thirty-five substantive federal laws deal with mining
alone. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
151. See Adler, supra note 119, at 1006. Adler calls the current system "management
anarchy" only in response to the agencies' lack of a unified agenda or goal and the existence
of varying biases and interests. See generally id.
152. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, THE BIG KILL: DECLINING BIODIVERSITY IN
AMERICA'S LAKES AND RIVERS 35-68 (David S. Wilcove & Michael J. Bean, eds., 1994)
(suggesting that the states' governments and the federal government fail to sufficiently
implement environmental laws in a manner that protects threatened and endangered
species). Likewise, nonpoint source pollution is a major source of watershed pollution yet
is essentially uncontrolled under the current state and federal regulatory regimes. See also
Christina M. Shriver, Note, Is it Safe to Drink? The Problem of Contaminated Water and

the Need for FederalAction, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 547, 548 (1998) (suggesting that the
federal government must become more involved in water pollution control).
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support. 153
The community-based watershed movement's growth would shock
even the unflinching John Wesley Powell.' 54 In 1990, possibly a handful of
community-based watershed groups existed throughout the West. Today,

by one estimate, the West can boast of at least 400 well-developed groups
that allow varying degrees of citizen participation in watershed
management activities.' 55 Others estimate that nearly 5,000 groups exist

across the entire United States. 156
What may be more shocking is that many "economists, ranchers, tree-

huggers, sociologists, lumber company employees, and even some federal
land managers" are unabashed proponents of this concept.'5 7 Nearly every
western state either legislatively or administratively adopted a watershed
approach with varying degrees of community participation. 5 ' In addition,
both the President and the EPA unequivocally embraced community-based
collaborative processes as part of their new Clean Water Initiative.'S9 With
support from such varied interests, many people now ask difficult
questions, such as "what is community-based watershed management?"
and "does it work?"

153. See generally WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE
WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-38, 3-40 (1997). The trend toward
devolution of power to local interests began during the Reagan presidency and re-ignited
after the 1994 Republican congressional victories.
154. Powell is unflinching because, according to legend, he ran every rapid in the Grand
Canyon's heart on the formerly wild and dam-free Colorado River.
155. Telephone Interview with Douglas Kenney, supra note 81. In Colorado alone, the
number of community-based watershed groups increased from six in 1996 to thirty in 1998.
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, THE STATE ROLE IN WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES

40 n.54 (1998).
156. Telephone Interview with Douglas Kenney, supra note 81.
Much of the
determination of the number of existing community-based watershed groups depends on
how you define the terms. Each word in "community-based watershed management" can
be interpreted in numerous ways that affect the number of groups included. Some
commentators only consider those groups that directly participate in decision-making forums
to be watershed initiatives. Other commentators include all groups that have any water
resources focus, including groups that merely educate or lobby on water issues. Id.
157. George Cameron Coggins, "Devolution" in Federal and Land Law: Abdication by
Any OtherName. . ., 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 211, 212 (1996).
158. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY CENTER, supra note 155. In addition,
the Western Governors' Association calls for new methods of environmental problem
solving.
This new program, called Enlibra, "speaks to greater participation and
collaboration in decision making, focuses on outcomes rather than just programs, and
recognizes the need for a variety of tools beyond regulation that will improve environmental
and natural resource management."
Western Governors' Association, Enlibra (last
modified Jan. 28, 2000) < http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/enlibra/default.htm >.
159. The Clean Water Initiative "envisions a new, collaborative effort by federal, state,
tribal, and local governments; the public; and the private sector to restore and sustain the
health of watersheds in the Nation. The watershed approach is the key to setting priorities
and taking action to clean up rivers, lakes, and coastal waters."
UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

PROTECTING AMERICA'S RIVERS ii

(1998).

CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND
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A. WHAT IS COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT?
No matter what policies exist at any level of government,
1
they will fail without the support of local communities and citizens."

Community-based watershed initiatives have their foundation in a
larger movement known as community-based conservation ("CBC"). In
6
the abstract, CBC attempts to harmonize utilitarian and preservationist1 1
interests in natural resources management. 162 Moreover, as the above
quote suggests, it is believed that conservation efforts are more effective
when the citizens who are affected by the decisions support the plan.163 As
a matter of on-the-ground pragmatism, CBC often takes the form of an
open public forum through which disparate communities of place and of
Collaborative learning
interest" engage in "collaborative learning. '
embodies the idea that when people put forth an effort to problem-solve,
they can effectively deal with complex issues and reach consensus
solutions. "

A brief survey of the CBC movement over the last ten years reveals a
variety of strengths and weaknesses, many of which have manifested
themselves in the Stakeholders Group's history. The following section
serves as an introduction to various CBC concepts that apply to the
Stakeholders Group.

160. BOB DOPPELT ET AL., ENTERING THE WATERSHED:
AMERICA'S RIVER ECOSYSTEMS 62 (1993).

A NEw

APPROACH TO SAVE

161. Utilitarianists, most personified by Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the Forest
Service, believe that natural resources should be managed to provide the greatest good to
the greatest number of humans. The preservationists, most personified by John Muir,
founder of the Sierra Club, desire to protect wilderness and wild places based on their
intrinsic values. See David Western, Linking Conservation and Community Aspirations, in
NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION 499, 500
(David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994).
162. See David Western & R. Michael Wright, The Background to Community-Based
Conservation, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED
CONSERVATION 1, 1-4 (David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994).
163. See id. at 4; see generally Sean T. McAllister, Community-Based Conservation:
Restructuring Institutions to Involve Local Communities in a Meaningful Way, 10 COLO. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 225 (1999).
164. The phrase "communities of place" refers to the most common conception of
community-a group of people living in a geographically defined area. On the other hand,
the phrase "communities of interest" refers to geographically disperse people who share
common interests or beliefs, for example, Sierra Club members. See generally Western &
Wright, supra note 162, at 8 (addressing the difficulty of defining community).
165. See Sara F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a Community of Values,
14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 107 (1993).
166. See HARINA J. CORTNER & MARGARET A. MOOTE, THE POLITICS OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 91 (1999). See also Bates, supra note 165, at 107.
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B. DOES IT WORK? STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED EFFORTS

Collaborativeefforts are largely unproven experiments,
bolstered more by desperate enthusiasm and unsubstantiated
generalizations
167
than by real and documented results.

Direct civic participation in regulatory decisions is a defining element

of democracy. 16'

Alexis de Tocqueville recognized it as the essential

characteristic of American society. 161 Today, however, Americans display
widespread dissatisfaction with and distrust of government. Some people
claim that the populace is apathetic; others suggest America's
governmental system compels belief in the futility of participation.17 A

brief look at the normative assumptions of CBC and the factors related to
its successes and failures suggests that CBC has the potential to ignite
meaningful public participation in environmental decision-making.
1. Normative Assumptions Behind CBC

a. Consensus Is Desirable
CBC's basic premise-that consensus solutions are desirable-is not
necessarily intuitive.
Multiple negotiators cannot always reach
consensus.17 1 Agreement becomes difficult when parties take absolute or

uncompromising positions. 171 Continued disagreement may not represent

bad faith negotiating; rather, it may reflect different value judgments and
incentives. ' Further, consensus problem-solving can actually become anti-

democratic if carried out in a manner that excludes interested parties or
suppresses dissent.
However, CBC's proponents act inappropriately if, in order to further
174

consensus, they suppress dissent or disallow faction representation.

Rather, CBC promises that competing factions can forge workable and
167. DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST
WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE IN
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2 (2000).
168. See CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 91.
169. Id. at 92.
170. See id. at 93.
171. This challenge is magnified as the number of negotiators increases. See generally
Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and Pitfalls, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
172. For example, Earth First! promises no compromise in defense of Mother Earth.
173. See Amy, supra note 171, at 226.
174. See generally Jane Braxton Little, Quincy Library Group Bars Outsiders, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 26, 1999, at 4.
Perhaps these proponents would accept limited
representation and dissent in the name of on-the-ground pragmatism. Recently, the Quincy
Library Group, one of the most famous community-based natural resource management
initiatives, decided to exclude disruptive dissenters. This move led to increased criticism of
the group by environmental groups. See id.
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cost-effective

solutions through purely democratic

processes

which

encourage dissent and debate. If communities can work in a "climate of
tolerant discourse toward a set of shared goals," then democracy gains
strength.175 Further, unlike litigation or top-down legislation,' 7 6 CBC
processes allow those directly affected by management decisions to fashion7

their own arrangement rather than have one imposed by government.17
This more idealistic formulation of the issue is the intuitive principle that
attracts so many supporters to CBC.
b. Empowering Communities Is Important
CBC's disciples claim that these participatory measures empower
stakeholders l1 8 and interested citizens to involve themselves in making

decisions that affect their lives.' 79 This process can help reestablish trust
among previously antagonistic stakeholders and can contribute to a
renewed sense of community.'
This concept of community-building
through consensus-based decision-making commonly occurs in many
cultures and disciplines.' 8 ' In the natural resources context, some
commentators call this concept the " 'hot-tub' school of mediation"
because it embraces collaborative processes as a "cooperative,
communitarian, and even spiritual alternative to adversarial politics."" 2

CBC's efforts do not invariably create community empowerment and
trust. In fact, in some instances, consensus processes only further polarize
communities. 8 3 Some people attribute these failures, however, to external

factors such as a lack of funding or of leadership

84

rather than to an

intrinsic attribute of community-based efforts.

175. See Peter R. Decker, The New West, Ground Zero: Re-creating Community in
Ridgway, Colorado, 3 CHRON. OF COMMUNITY 43, 50 (1999).
176. See Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1998). Topdown legislation refers to Congress' or to a federal agencies' creation of new regulations or
laws without the participation of effected citizens. Law created in this manner derives from
a top-down or hierarchical manner. Conversely, grassroots or bottom-up legislation derives
from a process of community led decision-making. Id. at 1374-75.

177. See

LAWRENCE

S.

BACOW &

MICHAEL WHEELER,

ENVIRONMENTAL

DISPUTE

18-19 (1984).
178. See Nickelsburg, supra note 176, at 1371. A stakeholder has an interest in the
decision's resolution. This stake can consist of an array of interests including but not
limited to economic interests or environmental preservation interests. The breath of
shareholder's definition rendered the term nearly meaningless in the CBC context. Id. at
1372. Thus, the CBC movement defines itself by those who invest time and energy in the
process.
179. See id. at 1372-73, 1392-93.
RESOLUTION

180.
181.

See
Cf.

CORTNER

& MOOTE, supra note 166, at 97.

J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 83 (1987)
(suggesting that Quaker and Shaker societies exemplify the "communitarian" vision).
182. Id. at 85.
DOUGLAS

183. See SERGE MOSCOVICI & WILLEM DoISE, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: A GENERAL
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS 14 (W.D. Halls trans., 1994).
184. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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Broad Community Involvement Is Better

A third commonly cited virtue of CBC is that these efforts receive
input from a much broader array of community members and interests than
do the normal top-down regulatory processes.'
This conclusion assumes
that CBC efforts include broad community representation."' Many dispute
this assumption; they claim that CBC projects often lack strong
environmental representation, a quality that undermines the process's
legitimacy. 87
"It is no coincidence that environmental groups tend to be the biggest
opponents of these efforts."' 8 In the CBC context, environmentalists often
feel outnumbered by adverse interests and unwelcomed in the process.
Indeed, some commentators argue that industry groups favor this type of
dispute resolution because they believe that they can outmaneuver
environmentalists. Environmentalists complain that industry uses these
processes to play on local citizens' sympathies in order to avoid compliance
with strict federal laws. Other commentators deny the existence of
industry dominance and claim the best CBC examples have strong
representation from all interested parties.
The inclusion of a broad variety of interests often depends on an
effective leader. In most successful CBC projects, the personality of a
non-biased leader enables participation of a variety of interests. 8 9 Keys to
successful leadership include facilitating information exchange and
maintaining an open process that empowers participants with real decisionmaking authority."9 Other smaller things, such as holding meetings at
convenient times for all participants, help keep people involved.
Therefore, to remain effective CBC must create incentives for participants
to stay involved.' 9'
d. CBC Remains More Efficient than the Current System
A fourth common assumption is that CBC is worthwhile because the
traditional regulatory system either fails or is too costly, both socially and
financially, to implement. 92
CBC supporters feel that traditional
regulatory approaches are comprised of inadequate, draconian qualities.
For example, many watershed groups form in response to concerns over
the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act or other strict federal

185. It is commonly believed that traditional mechanisms of law or of rulemaking are
dominated by discrete special interests that produce an "iron triangle," which is comprised
of the regulators, the regulated, and the legislators; thus, it excludes the general populace.
WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 153, at 3-39.
186. A prerequisite to including a community is defining a community. This process is
not as simple as it might seem. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 203.
187. See Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaborationhas its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 28.
188. Telephone Interview with Doug Kenney, supra note 81.
189. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 49.
190. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 202.
191. CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 101.
192. DOPPELT ET AL., supra note 160, at 42-45.
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laws. 9 3 In contrast, the guarantees of traditional regulatory structures
convince some that involvement in CBC efforts is unwise or unnecessary.
While many people point to the remarkable improvement of the
nation's environment over the last thirty years as proof of the regulatory
system's success,194 others believe the system's utility may soon be
exhausted. 195
Ironically, the traditional regulatory system provides
conflicting incentives to participate in and to opt out of CBC efforts. Game
theorists believe that negotiators will opt out if they feel they achieve
success outside of the consensus forum.196 Additionally, stakeholders may
choose not to participate in such efforts "because they do not wish to
recognize the legitimacy of other parties, because they seek delay, or
because the costs of negotiating seem to outweigh any expected
benefits." '1 97 Where stakeholders may reluctantly negotiate, government
should foster incentives to conducting negotiations in good faith. 98 The
traditional regulatory system's attraction may explain why many large
environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, often opt out of CBC
efforts.
Commentators disagree about whether the government or community
groups should be given ultimate decision-making authority in these
situations. Some commentators believe that giving direct decision-making
authority to CBC groups is the only way to keep interested parties from
opting out of these efforts."9 Those who support this position believe that
with governmental agencies' assistance and support, citizens can find
common grounds and workable solutions. °° Conversely, some worry that
this devolution of decision-making authority will return America to the
days when locals made unsustainable decisions that other citizens were
forced to subsidize. 2 °' Very few, if any, CBC projects hold direct
management authority over the resource in question. Rather, CBCs
generally play an informal advisory role to the various government
agencies who make the final decision.
2. Defining the Success of CBC
The word "success" is comprised of value judgments and unspoken
assumptions. Thus, the goal of developing an all-inclusive and objective

193. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 62. The CWA and CERCLA are also common
reasons for the creation of CBC groups in the United States. Id. at 65.

194. See generally GREGG

EASTERBROOK,

A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF

ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM (1995).

195. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE
U.S. SYSTEM WORK? 31, 48 (1997).
196. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 108-10 (1981). The premise turns on the assumption that negotiation
or consensus will occur only after parties exhausted their the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement. Id. See also BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 177, at 26.
197. See BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 177, at 28.
198. See id. at 339. Incentives might include paying people. Id.
199. CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 102-03.
200. Id. at 97.
201. Id. at 102-03.
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definition of success for every watershed initiative may be impossible or
inappropriate.
Each CBC effort focuses on very unique situations.
Success in one initiative may equal failure in another. Thus, the only
useful measurement of success in this context may be to compare the onthe-ground results of restoration efforts in two different settings: (1) when
communities use watershed initiatives and (2) when they use the traditional
regulatory system.20 2
This inquiry is fraught with difficulties. Government implements the
traditional regulatory system with varying degrees of rapidity and success.
Asking regulators or researchers to compare the effectiveness of the
traditional system and the community-based watershed initiatives will likely
produce only educated guesses. On the other hand, many regulatory
schemes do contain objective implementation timelines that are useful for
comparisons.
Some commentators claim that a successful effort exists if a "diverse
group of participants has gained a better understanding of each other's
concerns, and the level of trust has increased." 20 3 Others claim the creation
of community trust measures success insufficiently. This debate is moot if
the CBC established creation of community trust as a project goal;
establishment of trust meets one of the CBC's goals. Conversely, if the
CBC established water quality remediation as its goal, then creating
community trust remains insufficient to rise to the level of a successful
effort.
Remember that many problems, such as those in the Upper Animas
basin, took decades or centuries to evolve.
To expect immediate
remediation of long-term problems may be unrealistic for both CBC
initiatives and traditional regulatory approaches. Therefore, efforts that
create a viable process through which average citizens and stakeholders
feel more empowered could be considered successful in the short-run. 2°4
Of course, "over the 2long-term,
these efforts must be evaluated in terms of
05
resource conditions."
Reaching a goal requires setting a goal. The goal setting process
requires people to define their vision of success at the beginning of the
community-based watershed initiative. 2° In this light, if a CBC effort
merely facilitates agreement on the initiative's goals, observers could deem
the effort a success. Thus, a rigid characterization of success in the CBC
context is inappropriate.2 7

202. See generally Kenney, supra note 11, at 34.
203. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 14. In fact, this is the most commonly cited
justification for the utility of community-based watershed initiatives.
See Telephone
Interview with Douglas S. Kenney, supra note 81.
204. Id. at 60.
205. See id. Telephone Interview with Jim Martin, Attorney for Environmental Defense
Fund (Apr. 6, 1999).
206. See KENNEY, supra note 167, at 7-10.
207. Id. at 10.
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3. Barriers to Success of CBC Efforts
CBC efforts face at least three substantial barriers:2 °. (1) acquiring the
funding necessary to carry out a project; (2) implementing a comprehensive
solution despite the fragmentation of governmental management; and (3)
avoiding the negative consequences of at least one federal law. 209

Acquiring the necessary funds is always a main concern and funding
has posed substantial problems in the past.

Very few CBC efforts can

survive solely on volunteer labor. Inadequate and inconsistent funding
sources hinder the creation and the utilization of CBC approaches. At a
minimum, CBC efforts require a paid coordinator to maintain the group.210
Most CBC efforts "are highly, if not completely, reliant on [flederal funds,
successful efforts typically do not wean themselves from
and even the most 211
support."
[flederal
At least one state created a special agency to facilitate and to fund
community-based watershed initiatives.2 2 In 1987, the Oregon legislature
created the Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board to improve
watershed health and to provide resources for education about watershed

issues. 2113 Funding for the program has increased from $500 thousand to
$21 million.214

As a result, Oregon has the most highly developed

community-based watershed program in the West.21 5

Governmental decision-making fragmentation is also a true barrier to
success. Even a well-funded CBC effort may lack a pragmatic solution due
to state and federal management agencies' unwillingness to harmonize their
activities.
Often, various governmental agencies have conflicting or

See Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the
See generally McAllister,
supra note 163, at 202-03.
209. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Rules and
Executive Orders: Judicial Interpretations and Suggested Revisions 4 (May 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Natural Resources Law Center, University of
Colorado).
210. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 64.
208.

Environment, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 683, 703-07 (1992).

211.

Id. at53.

212. OR.

REV. STAT.

Enhancement

Board,

§ 541.360 (1995). See For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed
GWEB

Funding

Program

(visited

Feb.

15,

2000)

< http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebfund.html >.
213. The Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board is now known as the Oregon
A watershed council means "a voluntary local
Watershed Enhancement Board.
organization, designated by a local government group convened by a county governing
body, to address the goal of sustaining natural resource and watershed protection,
restoration and enhancement within a watershed." See OR. REV. STAT. § 541.350 (1995)
amended by 1999 Oregon Laws Ch. 1026 (H.B. 3225). Watershed councils "develop plans
and projects to protect or improve watershed conditions, educate people about watershed
conditions and functions and to monitor the projects and conditions of the watershed." See
For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board, Program Overview
(visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebprogram.html>.
214. See For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board, GWEB
Funding Program (visited Feb. 15, 2000) < http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebfund.html >.
215. More than ninety watershed groups occur in Oregon. Governor's Watershed
Enhancement Board, Locally Organized Watershed Councils in Oregon (last modified Aug.
12, 1999) <http://es54071.easystreet.com/group/gweb-wscs.htm>.
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inconsistent goals. 16 Unless the CBC can convince these agencies to adopt
the community's solution, a comprehensive solution may never
materialize." 7

Federal agencies tend to be leery of directly adopting

CBC's recommendations.
The most commonly cited legal reason for federal agencies' hesitance
to participate in CBC efforts is the Federal Advisory Committee Act

("FACA").218 Federal agencies and community groups often overestimate

the restrictions imposed by FACA, largely due to numerous lawsuits
219
against federal agencies that have led to "FACA-phobia."
Environmentalists sued the federal government alleging that various
community-based collaborative groups are "utilized by" federal agencies in
violation of FACA. 220 The major lawsuits dealing with this issue should
provide the vast majority of community-based watershed groups with the
assurance that FACA does not cover their activities. 221 However, many

observers call for the law's revision to ensure it does not inhibit the
development of collaborative community-based forums.
In summary, the current understanding of CBC efforts reveals that
these efforts may not offer an appropriate solution for every community or

situation. CBC is not a panacea for every environmental ill. 23 Rather, it
is a movement in its infancy. It must withstand continual, rigorous
reevaluation to verify that CBC's promise is synonymous with its reality.
V.

A CASE STUDY OF THE ANIMAS RIVER STAKEHOLDERS
GROUP

People are more willing to take costly actions
and to make personalsacrifices to protect and restore a specialplacelike the ... ColoradoRiverthan to promote the abstractidea of environmentalquality.224
The Stakeholders Group also must withstand continual reexamination if

216. This does not suggest that the government agencies' conflicting goals represent a
bad faith effort by the agencies. Rather, Congress dictated different legislative mandates
for each agency. In addition, these agencies must respond to different constituents. Thus,
if agencies disagree it could be caused by their constituents' disagreements.
217. This is particularly true in the case of the Stakeholders Group. If the Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management, or other state or federal agencies, are unable or unwilling
to coordinate their efforts, a comprehensive solution may be impossible.
218. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1994); see Thomas Brendler, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act: What You Need to Know, CHRON. OF COMMUNITY, Autumn 1996, at 44,
44.
219. See Brendler, supra note 218, at 46.
220. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1996). See also Rieke, supra note 209, at 3-6.
221. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 461 (1989)
(stating that FACA applies only to groups "organized by, or closely tied to, the [flederal
[glovernment, and thus enjoying a quasi-public status.").
222. Rieke, supra note 209, at 7.
223. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 224.
224. Robert W. Adler, Managing Colorado Watersheds for Riparian and Wetland
Values, 1997 COLO. RIPARIAN ASS'N 6.

Issue 2

COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

it wants to continue working to improve water quality in the Upper Animas
basin during the next century. As mentioned above, the Division requested

that the Center facilitate the creation of a community-based watershed
group in the Upper Animas basin in early 1994. The Center began this
process by interviewing "various mining, federal land management, local
government, environmental, and related interests" to determine their
willingness to participate in a collaborative process to resolve the mining
contamination in the Animas Basin. 2' From the beginning, people in the

Upper Animas basin indicated that they did not want an externally
imposed, top-down regulatory solution.226
The Center found that this sentiment originated in two sources. First,
locals worried that the Commission would proceed "with or without their
involvement in initiating clean up." 227 Second, locals saw the collaborative
approach as an opportunity to avoid the stigma of Superfund designation
that would inevitably bring a greater federal role in the clean up. 228 In fact,
the local distrust of EPA ran so deep that EPA officials in the area actually
received death threats warning against their involvement in the basin.229
As a result, during the first several Stakeholders Group meetings,

participants observed an "acrimonious mood" created by the private

participants' distrust of both the Commission and the Center.23 ° In these

initial meetings, the private participants took a reactive role by responding
to the Commission's direction and concern. However, by mid-1994, a
core group, consisting of approximately thirty people, emerged and began
to "work diligently in [proactively] identifying and addressing pertinent
issues.,21
The Stakeholders Group's core participants are private citizens and
representatives from nearly every federal, state, and local government
agency with management responsibility over the area. 32 Given that eighty-

225. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33.
226. See id. at 40.
227. See id.
228. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 13.
229. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, Director of Friends of the Animas River
(Apr. 26, 1999). The person making the threats turned out to be a local man who ironically
wound up attending some Stakeholders Group's meetings. After he found that government
officials and other participating parties actually listened to his complaints and concerns, he
claimed that his faith in government had been restored. Telephone Interview with Carol
Russell, supra note 38.
230. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 40.
231. Id.
232. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Animas River Updates (visited Feb. 26,
2000) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/arupdate.html>.
The entities listed as official
participants include: the Colorado Division of Public Health and the Environment; the
Colorado Division of Minerals and Geology; the Colorado Division of Wildlife; the
Colorado Geological Survey, the Colorado River Watch; the City of Durango; the Durango
and Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad; the Echo Bay Mines Company; the Friends of the
Animas River; the Gold King Mines; the Little Nation Mining Company; the Mining
Remedial Recovery Company; the OSIRIS Gold Company; the River Watch Network; the
Root and Norton Assayers; the St. Paul Lodge; the San Juan County Commissioners; the
San Juan County Historical Society; the Silver Wing Company; the Town of Silverton; the
Southern Ute Tribe; the Southwest Colorado Water Conservation District; the Sunnyside
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three percent of San Juan County is public land, broad representation from

governmental sources is particularly important.23 3 The Stakeholders Group
agreed on a mission of "improving water quality and aquatic habitats in the
Animas River watershed through a collaborative process designed to
encourage participation from all interested parties."234 Due to a variety of
legal and logistical concerns, the group chose to depend on consensusbased decision-making and to avoid any formal voting procedures.2 35 The
Stakeholders Group holds meetings on the third Thursday of every month
at the Silverton town hall. Involvement by any interested party is
encouraged through community outreach.236

Based on the Division's recommendation, the Commission quickly
challenged the Stakeholders Group's sophistication and cohesiveness by

adopting strict numerical water quality standards for the Upper Animas
River in early 1995.237 These standards would have required a significant
water quality improvement to make the river hospitable to aquatic life." 8
The Stakeholders Group opposed these standards because they would not

allow the flexibility necessary to fashion their own solution.
At the Stakeholders Group's request, the Commission agreed to

suspend the new standards'

implementation until March 1998; the

Stakeholders Group agreed to develop their own management
recommendations.239 In the interim, the Commission retained the basin's

narrative standard to ensure that no further water quality deterioration
would occur. 240 From 1995 to 1998, the Stakeholders Group accomplished
enough progress to convince the Commission's majority that this CBC
experiment remained a worthwhile pursuit.

Gold Corporation; the Tusco Company; the United States Bureau of Land Management; the
United States Bureau of Reclamation; the United States Corps of Engineers; the United
States Environmental Protection Agency; the United States Forest Service; and the United
States Geologic Survey. See id.
233. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Hi[sftory and Stakeholder Process (visited
Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/history.html>. A detailed discussion of
the representation on the Stakeholders Group follows. See infra Part V.C.2.
234. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Mission Statement & Goals, (visited Feb.
26, 2000) < http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/mission.html >.
235. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 14. These concerns included concerns with FACA and
with creating a voting system that fairly represented all interests. Id. See also Telephone
Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator of Animas River Stakeholders Group (May 10,
1999).
236. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Hittory [sic] and Stakeholder Process
(visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/history.htmi>.
237. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
238. Id.
239. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 42. This decision
included provisions requiring the Stakeholders Group to maintain current ambient standards
in the Upper Animas basin, to develop a strategy for cleaning up mine-related pollution, and
to work within the commission's target set for eventual water quality improvements that
would allow a sustainable brown trout fishery upstream from Silverton. Id.
240. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
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A. STAKEHOLDERS GROUP ACTIVITIES, 1995-1998
The Stakeholders

Group began with a three-phase

strategy

to

accomplish the goals set by the Commission. First, the Stakeholders
Group planned to conduct extensive water quality studies to establish
baseline chemical, physical, and biological conditions in the Upper Animas
basin. Next, it attempted to determine the most serious contamination
Finally, its strategy
sources and to prioritize sites for clean up.
"'
contemplated the initiation of on-the-ground remediation projects.24
In 1995, the Stakeholders Group, with extensive assistance from the
Colorado Division of Mining and Geology, conducted detailed

investigations of the mine sites and of the stream quality in Mineral Creek,

which feeds into the Animas River.242 The EPA funded 243 the research,
which also required technical assistance from the United States Forest

Service and the Colorado Geologic Survey.244

Early in 1996, the

Stakeholders Group collected similar data in Cement Creek, another
Animas River tributary.245 Finally in 1996, the Stakeholders Group
evaluated the Animas River Canyon to determine the habitat limitations for
aquatic life in general, and in particular, for brown trout.246
Multiple state and federal agencies worked with the Stakeholders

Group to collect the data for clean up prioritization of pollution sites. 247
Based on the data, the Stakeholders Group isolated five areas within the
basin that suffer from major contamination. The group felt that these sites
should receive the highest clean up effort priority.2 48 Several stakeholders

initiated remediation projects for these sites including: the Mining
Remedial Recovery Company at Placer Gulch; the Sunnyside Gold
Corporation at several locations; the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") at Forest Queen, Mayday, Joe and John, and Lark Mines; Salem
Minerals Company at Mammoth tunnel; the Office of Surface Mining at
the Galena Queen Mine; and the Silver Wing Mining Company at Silver
Wing Mine. 249

241. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 36.
242. Id. at 43.
243. See id. The Stakeholders Group relies on EPA's section 319 nonpoint source
funding. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(b)(2)(E), 1329(h), 1329(i) (1994).
244. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 43.
245. Id. at 36.
246. Id. at 44.
247. For example, using Clean Water Act section 319 grant money from EPA, the
Stakeholders Group contracted with the Colorado Division of Minerals and Geology to
conduct most of the characterization work. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra
Throughout this process, the Division collected and managed the data
note 235.
accumulated by the Stakeholders Group. However, the Division recently relinquished this
responsibility to the Stakeholders Group because the Division lacked adequate staff and
funding. Further, the Division feels that the Stakeholders Group needs to handle this
function itself. Id.
248. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 42. These priority
areas include: the California Gulch in the Upper Animas basin; the Kohler area on the
North Mineral Creek; the Middle Fork of Mineral Creek; the Prospect Gulch in Cement
Creek; and the Upper Cement Creek. Id.
249. Id. at 36. Other remediation projects are currently underway. See inifra Part V.D.
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Funding and technical support for these efforts came from a variety of
sources, including the EPA, the BLM, the Department of Interior, private
mining companies, Stakeholders Group participants, the Office of Surface
Mining, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the United States Geological
Survey. These remediation projects tested new forms of controlling AMD,
which varied from controlling waste runoff to treating runoff with lime
additives.250 The Stakeholders Group estimated that $20 million has been
spent on monitoring, feasibility studies, and remediation projects in the
basin. Unfortunately, much more needs to be spent.251 However, fears of
incurring liability prevented the Stakeholders Group from conducting more
remediation work. This holds particularly true for AMD, which the
Stakeholders Group considers the most significant pollution source.252
B. THE INITIAL REVIEW OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP IN 1998
When the Commission initially reviewed the Stakeholder's Group's
progress in 1998, it was obvious that the Stakeholder's Group needed more
time to gather data that could serve as a guide for setting use designation
standards under the CWA. 5 3 The Stakeholders Group asked for a threeyear extension to complete this work. At least one Commission member
believed that the Stakeholders Group's progress failed to justify an
extension. 54 Yet, after further discussions, the Commission concluded that
the Stakeholders Group made significant progress at acquiring data for the
Upper Animas River and that their efforts would eventually lead to new
use designation standards.5 5 Therefore, the Commission unanimously
agreed to grant a three-year extension to the Stakeholders Group.256
The Stakeholders Group now has until March of 2001 to complete its
recommendations for water quality standards in the Upper Animas River. 25'
Until that time, the Commission retained the relatively unimposing
narrative standard to protect fish habitat under the CWA. The Commission
stated it felt that this would prevent further water quality deterioration
while allowing the maximum flexibility for the Stakeholders Group to
develop a workable solution.5 8
The Commission admitted this additional delay would likely be

250. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 47.
251. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
252. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 6, 1999)
<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>. See also infra Part V.C.3.
253. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
254. Telephone Interview with Peter Nichols, Former Chairman of Colorado Water
Quality Control Commission (Apr. 19, 1999).
255. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
256. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
257. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998). In reality, the Stakeholders Group only
has until the fall of 2000. Then the Commission will hold its public hearings on the Upper
Animas basin's water quality standards. At that time, the Commission expects the
Stakeholders Group to present its plan. The Commission will set water quality standards in
February of 2001 based on the recommendations of the Division and the Stakeholders
Group. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
258. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
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inadequate for the Stakeholders Group to achieve water quality
improvements that satisfy the more stringent numerical standards passed
and deferred by the Commission in 1995.259 However, the Commission
expects that the Stakeholders Group will present its recommendations for
the appropriate water quality standards in the basin. The Stakeholders
Group expects to make recommendations based on all available data they
have gathered.2 6 If the Commission rejects the Stakeholders Group's
recommendations, it intends to reinstate strict numerical standards to
provide a legal stimulus for further action.26
Bureaucratic difficulties surround the Commission's decision to
delegate to the Stakeholders Group the authority to set water quality
standards. In 1998, EPA rejected the Commission's decision to defer
EPA rejected these
setting numerical standards for three years. 262 The EA
narrative standards because they claim Colorado lacks an adequate system
for setting narrative standards.263 However, the EPA agreed not to set its
own standards during this three year period in deference to the
Stakeholders Group. 2" While the EPA supports the Stakeholders Group
process through grants and technical support, the Commission admits that
the Stakeholders Group process does not fit within the CWA's regulatory
framework that the EPA must enforce.265
In the past, state water quality standards set under the CWA took effect
as soon as the state submitted them to EPA for approval. If EPA rejected a
state's submission, then the state's last approved standards remained in
effect until EPA promulgated its own standards.2 6 When, as in this case,
EPA rejected a state's proposed standards, but declined to set its own
standards, then the rejected standards remained in place until EPA
approved new standards.267
However, if in 2001 the Commission decides to defer the standards
again, the outcome may yield a different result due to a recent federal
district court case.
In Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clarke, the
Washington federal district court found that the CWA's plain language
revealed that state water quality standards could not take effect until the
EPA actually approved them.2 68 EPA subsequently endorsed this opinion
by suggesting that this CWA interpretation applied nationwide, despite the
fact that the case only bound the federal district in Washington.269 One

259. Id.
260. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 256.
261. Id.
262. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manager for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (Mar. 17, 1999).
263. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
264. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
265. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 262.
266. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
267. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manger for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (Apr. 26, 1999).
268. Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clarke, No. C96-1762R, 1997 WL 446499, at *34 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 8, 1997).
269. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 262.
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Division employee described the EPA interpretation as a "bombshell"
because EPA remains notoriously slow at approving standards.27 °

Requiring EPA to approve state water quality standards before they
take effect could leave numerous river segments unregulated. Responding
to this concern, EPA is attempting to speed up its approval process.271 In
the alternative, EPA could unilaterally set state water quality standards
based on generalized scientific information, which may be inappropriate or

unnecessary for some river segments.272 However, as a practical matter,

EPA has too few resources to set water quality standards in every state
where it rejected proposed standards.273
This new interpretation puts more pressure on the Stakeholders Group
to produce concrete results. Colorado wants to avoid a situation where the
EPA unilaterally sets inappropriate standards for the Upper Animas basin.
If the Stakeholders Group asks for another deferral in 2001, that request
will likely fall on the deaf ears of both the Commission and the EPA.274
While the Stakeholders Group does not intend to ask for another extension
in 2001,275 it remains questionable whether the EPA will embrace the
Stakeholders Group's water quality standards recommendations.
While the Stakeholders Group has provided a new avenue for solving
water quality problems in the Upper Animas basin, it has a lot left to
complete. The Stakeholders Group's progress with collecting pollution
data and creating goodwill among locals led some commentators to call the
Stakeholders Group a success.276 In reality, it remains too early to declare
victory. However, by at least one estimate, the upper Animas basin is

closer to being cleaned up today than it would be had the Stakeholders
Group not existed.277

C. THE PEOPLE AND THE ISSUES BEHIND THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

A variety of individuals and government agencies support the
Stakeholders Group's continuing activities.
To understand the
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. The EPA's "Gold Book" sets generalized numeric concentrations of pollutants that
river segments can handle and still achieve various designated uses such as fishable or
swimmable. However, these standards do not reflect the actual on-the-ground conditions of
many river segments. Therefore, these standards may impose unnecessary restrictions on
some sources while ignoring other sources. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra
note 67, at 6.
273. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 267.
274. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
275. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River Stakeholders
Group (Apr. 13, 1999).
276. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 49.
277. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader for United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 26, 1999).
Russell argues that the
Stakeholders Group helped to convince the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
that these agencies could be liable under the CWA if they fail to help cleanup the mining
waste in the basin. As a result, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management helped
to secure a pilot project in the basin, the Abandoned Mined Land Initiative, that will
eventually help to clean up several more sites. Id.
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Stakeholders Group's dynamics, six particular participants and their efforts
must be discussed.
1. Bill Simon and the Animas River Stakeholders Group
A selection committee, consisting of mining representatives,
environmental groups, county officials, state officials, and federal
officials,278 chose Bill Simon as the Stakeholders Group's coordinator. By
all accounts, and consistent with the academic writings on the subject, Bill
leadership is one of the major reasons for the group's
Simon's 27effective
9
success.

Observers attribute Simon's effectiveness to two main characteristics.
First, people from both the environmental groups and the industry groups
trust Simon. Simon grew up on a farm in Loveland, Colorado, but has
lived in Silverton since 1970.280 He obtained a biology degree from the
University of Colorado and an evolutionary ecology doctorate from the
University of California at Berkley. The tall, slim, pony-tailed Simon also
served as a San Juan County commissioner from 1984 to 1988.281
Simon makes a living helping to design and reclaim mines in an
environmentally responsible way in the Upper Animas basin. During the
1980's, Simon "worked for probably every big mining company in
America. 282 He still runs an environmental consulting business and a
mining construction business. While his mining construction business
remains essentially dormant today, he continues to work as a consultant for
mining companies, focusing on minimizing mining's environmental
impacts and navigating various mining permitting processes.283
During the 1980's, the Sunnyside Gold Corporation, a company that
historically allowed high concentrations of toxic pollutants to flow directly
into the Animas River, 284 hired Simon to conduct consulting work. Simon
helped the mining company implement new storm water controls that
reduced these emissions dramatically. Almost immediately, the water
quality in receiving streams improved.285
After being elected county commissioner in 1984, Simon wanted to
capitalize on the improved water quality by reintroducing a viable fish
population into the Upper Animas River. Shortly thereafter, Simon
assembled a group of citizens to restock river segments with trout. 286 The
experiment successfully reintroduced a reproducing trout population in
portions of the river that had been declared inhospitable to aquatic life.
278. Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, Former Project Manager for Colorado
Center for Environmental Management (Apr. 8, 1999).
279. Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, President of Stewardship Initiatives
(Mar. 15, 1999).
280. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
286. Id.
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When the Commission found out about the trout populations living in
the Upper Animas River, it realized that it insufficiently classified the
stream under the CWA.287 As a result, the Division conducted experiments
that eventually led to the current CBC process. Thus, ironically, Simon's
experiment actually started the process that spurred the Stakeholders
Group's creation.
His extensive knowledge of water quality problems in the Upper
Animas basin earned Simon the respect and the trust of both environmental
groups and mining companies.
He cogently conveys the processes'
complicated scientific details to both scientists and laypeople.
More
importantly, Simon remains deeply committed to a collaborative decisionmaking process based on informed consensus. 288 As one participant said,
"when [the Stakeholders Group participants] come to the table together, we
are equals. If it wasn't that way, I wouldn't participate.289
The second reason that the Stakeholders Group made progress is
because Simon is a "workaholic." 21
Simon acts as the group's
spokesperson by answering questions from journalists, researchers, and
locals who seek information about the process. He arranges the monthly
meetings and agendas.
He coordinates the Stakeholders Group's
fundraising.
Furthermore, the Division recently turned over the
Stakeholders Group's entire information database for Simon to manage.
In addition to these administrative tasks, Simon also directly
participates in the on-the-ground research and data collection. He directs
the use attainability analysis development and the TMDL framework.
Each must be submitted to the state in 2001.
With all these
responsibilities, Simon admits he is beginning to be "spread a little thin. ,291
Eventually Simon will need staff support to continue effectively managing
the Stakeholders Group. But for now, Simon does it all.
One commentator said, "if you are lucky enough to have a Bill Simon,
you will succeed. If you don't, you won't., 29 2 When a potentially
controversial issue arises, Simon gets on the phone and begins the process
of building consensus with the fellow Stakeholders Group participants.
Usually, Simon calls Peter Butler and Steve Fearn first.
2.

Peter Butler and Environmental Representation

Peter Butler was the Commission's only person from Southwestern
Colorado and first person involved in the process with an environmental

287. Id. The CWA requires that a state has to attain the best water quality feasible in
each river in its state. When Simon and the citizens reintroduced the trout and the trout
reproduced, it became obvious that it might be feasible to improve the Animas River's
water quality and to change the river's classification. Id.
288. Id.
289. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, President of Silver Wing Mining Company
(Apr. 5, 2000).
290. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
291. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. One part-time volunteer from
Ft. Lewis College assists Simon. Id.
292. Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.
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In addition, he is one of the few environmentalists who has
consistently participated in the Stakeholders Group process since its
foCUS.

inception.

Butler lives in Durango and runs the environmental group

named Friends of the Animas River (FAR).294

Butler admits he's "a little uncomfortable" when called the main
environmentalist representative on the Stakeholders Group. 95 With a
masters degree in economics from the University of Colorado and a

doctorate in natural resources policy from the University of Michigan,
Butler concedes that his economist background and his general philosophies
might lead some environmentalists to consider him too moderate to
effectively represent their concerns. 2 6 While Bulter recognizes a lack of
environmental group representation on the Stakeholders Group, he
concludes that the absence should not concern people.
The first and perhaps the most important factor is that Silverton is a

small community that ties its economic prosperity to mining.

Despite

anecdotal evidence, it is hard for many people in the community to believe
or to imagine that the Upper Animas River ever looked different.297 In
addition, social concerns, such as securing adequate schools and medical
facilities, weigh more heavily in the local residents' minds than the river's
water quality problems.298
The second factor interrelates with the previous point. Most major
environmental groups work fifty miles south in Durango. 299 Locals have

not asked for the environmentalists' help. 3° Moreover, for these activists,

a pressing environmental problem that requires their attention does not

293. Butler recently lost his position on the Commission because Colorado's new
republican governor holds different values than Butler's. Telephone Interview with Peter
Butler, supra note 229.
Others suggest that Governor Owens appointed some right-wing "crazies" to change the
dynamics of the commission. Interview with Peter Nichols, supra note 254. However,
Butler and others from the Stakeholders Group doubt that the Commission will be any less
supportive of their activities. Id.
294. In 1993, FAR formed to fight several development proposals along the Animas
River in Durango. However, FAR defeated those proposals rendering itself relatively
inactive other than its involvement in the Stakeholders Group process. Telephone Interview
with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275. Simon explains that reports
from the beginning of the century prove that people used water from the Cement Creek for
irrigation and for other domestic uses. However, in 1903, inhabitants discontinued these
uses of the Animas River's tributary due to water quality degradation. Id.
298. Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
299. These groups include: the Friends of the Animas River (development around
Durango); the Taxpayers for the Animas River (Animas-La Plata); Mineral Policy Center
(mining all around the West); the Sierra Club (all public lands issues); the Southern Ute
Grassroots Organization (Animas-La Plata); and the Pine River Watershed Group (Pine
River east of Durango).
300. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, Southwest Circuit Rider for Mineral
Policy Center (Apr. 13, 1999). Dan Randolph of the Mineral Policy Center in Durango
would prefer that local citizens take the lead. He would participate more if asked to, but up
until now that request has not been forthcoming. Id.
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exist in the Upper Animas basin.3"' The Stakeholders Group's work does
not affect any endangered species. Further, there are no new proposals for
large-scale mining.
The mere logistics of driving to Silverton dissuades many interested
people from getting involved. In addition, understanding and meaningfully
participating in the Stakeholders Group requires a long-term investment of
time that many people cannot afford to make.30 2 Several local residents did
show up to the first
few Stakeholders Group meetings; however, they
"vented and left. 30 3
The lack of representation by environmentalists and by average citizens
remains a serious concern for many critics of community-based watershed
initiatives. At least one person claims that Colorado's community-based
watershed management efforts are a disguise for alternative forums of
intergovernmental cooperation that parade under the banner of community
involvement. '3° To a certain extent, these criticisms remain valid.
In 1995, locals criticized the Stakeholders Group for what they
perceived as overrepresentation of government agencies within the
group.3 5 Indeed, most major players in the Stakeholders Group came from
either government agencies with management responsibilities directly
implicated by the Stakeholders Group's process or mining interests that
have a direct economic stake in the process outcome. In response, Bill
Simon made some changes to make the process more attractive to locals.
First, he began to hold informal meetings with locals at the Silverton
library. In this informal setting, he would explain the Stakeholders
Group's progress and would ask active participants to present results of
their studies. 30 6 Next, Simon excluded the highly technical data from the
meetings and instead focused on broader policy concerns in order to keep
more local citizens interested. 3 7 Finally, the Stakeholders Group agreed
that "any construction activities evolving from the process must be
reviewed by the San Juan County Commissioners and the County
Historical Society" to ensure such activities did not compromise the
considerable historical value of the mines.30 8
Others argue that the group sufficiently represents interested parties
and that no one can create public interest where none exists.30 9 In addition,
the many government agency participants who live and work in the basin
would likely resent the suggestion that they only reflect the agencies'
viewpoints and do not reflect the community's values. 3'0 Regardless of
representation, the Commission still retains ultimate control over the water

301.
302.
303.
304.

Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, supra note 278.
Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.

305. See COLORADO
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT,

supra note 129, at 46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.
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quality standards implemented in the basin. If the Stakeholders Group did
put forth a plan that environmentalists or others opposed, then those
dissatisfied parties could still lobby the Commission or sue the state.
Either way, environmentalists and other interested parties have an
opportunity to influence the process.
3.

Steve Fearn and Small Landowners

Steve Fearn works as the president of Silver Wing Mining Company, a
small privately-held company with a currently inactive mine in the Upper
Animas basin.3 1
In addition, Fearn serves on the Southwest Water
Conservation District's ("SWCD") board,31 2 which is an association of
water rights holders that seeks to coordinate the development of water
resources in Southwest Colorado.3 3 Fearn, one of the Stakeholders
Group's initial organizers, represents a few similarly situated landowners
who would consider remining abandoned mine sites located on their lands
if they did not face grave legal liability.
In the Upper Animas basin, all but two of the major metalscontributing abandoned mine sites sit on private land.31 4 Under the CWA,
Colorado has the power to impose NPDES permits on landowners who
have abandoned mines on their lands. 3 5 However, the state will not pursue
this route for two reasons. First, it would impose permits on landowners
who did not directly cause the pollution problem, which would be
politically unpopular. Second, since these mines remain inactive, no
revenue stream exists from which to force compliance with a permit.31 6
Moreover, these same landowners could face liability under CERCLA
for the abandoned mine waste on their land. However, CERCLA liability
requires EPA to list the Upper Animas basin as a national priority. 3 7 In
addition, the political and the financial concerns that exist with CWA
liability also arise from CERCLA liability. The EPA simply has bigger
problems to address before going after small landowners.
EPA may not impose liability as long as landowners leave their
abandoned mines alone. Once these landowners begin trying to remine or
to reclaim the land, EPA will require a NPDES permit. Currently,
landowners have two remedies for the mining waste located on their land.
First, they can focus on hydrologic controls of runoff from existing mine
waste piles. Second, they can cap mine portals to avoid additional runoff
from these sources.
Landowners and third parties, such as the Stakeholders Group, can
generally work on the hydrologic controls without acquiring liability under
CWA.31 8 Yet, as soon as they touch discharging mine portals with the
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 264.
Id.
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1999).
Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
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intention of cleaning them up, they become subject to liability under the
CWA and CERCLA. 319 This disincentive to remediate abandoned mines,
even partially, has Fearn and his colleagues calling for changes in the
existing law.
Fearn argues that, under the current regime, the unregulated
abandoned mine sites continue to pollute the Animas River. If the
regulatory agencies lowered the permit standards to make remining
profitable for Fearn, he could afford to clean up some of the waste from
his land. This partial clean up, while less than law currently requires,
would arguably be better than the current unregulated situation.
While environmentalists from Durango and from elsewhere sympathize
with the landowners, they worry that fashioning a "small landowner"
definition would prove difficult. 320 Fearn claims that this opposition
represents
"misinformed
bomb
throwing"
from
Durango
environmentalists. 32 He also claims that the fear that "someone might get
away with something" remains unfounded.322 Additionally, Fearn feels
that groups like the Mineral Policy Center and the Sierra Club do not
understand the problems actually occurring in the Upper Animas basin.
The Stakeholders Group has not yet seriously considered Fearn's idea
of allowing him to remine his land. 3 3 First, Fearn is, perhaps, the only
small landowner in the basin for whom remining might be feasible under
such an exception. Second, the Stakeholders Group does support the same
exception from liability for third parties and for government agencies who
want to clean up abandoned mine sites. Last, Bill Simon admits that the
issue would become the most contentious and difficult issue the
Stakeholders Group ever had to reconcile.324
Currently, if a third party or a government agency attempts to clean up
an abandoned mine site, EPA can hold these "good samaritans" liable in
perpetuity for the discharges from these sites. 32 ' The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld such liability against a city and a regional water
authority that voluntarily cleaned up an abandoned mine site.326 In

working on hydrologic controls is premised on the assumption that such runoff is not
considered a point source under the CWA. Yet, the EPA has indicated that it considers
such runoff as a point source; however, it has never pursued an enforcement action based
on this interpretation. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
319. Stokstad, supra note 51, at 163-64.
320. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, supra note 81.
321. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
322. Id.
323. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
324. Id.
325. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 7.
326. See Committee to Save the Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d
305 (9 "hCir. 1993). In this case, an environmental group sued the East Bay Municipal
Utility District and the members of the California Regional Water Quality Control Board
claiming that the agencies' cleanup efforts lead to AMD discharge into a river without a
discharge permit under the CWA. Id. at 307. The court found irrelevant the fact that the
mine discharged less pollution than before the voluntary cleanup. Id. at 309. A concurring
opinion lamented that this case tells good samaritans to "[I]et the water degrade, let the fish
die, but protect your pocketbook from vast and unnecessary expenditures." Id. at 310.
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response to this barrier to clean up, the Stakeholders Group supports a
good samaritan provision ("GSP") that would amend the CWA to exempt
from liability state agencies and entities like the Stakeholders Group that
wish to voluntarily clean up abandoned mine sites.327
The Western Governors' Association lobbied Congress to enact the
GSP.328 In 1994, the Western Governors Association succeeded in having
the GSP introduced into Congress.32 9 While the initiative passed the
House, no one introduced the corresponding bill in the Senate.33 °
Subsequently, California enacted a law that provides an exemption from
state liability for voluntary clean-up of abandoned mine sites in California,
but federal liability under the CWA remains.331 The legislative lobbying 33
on2
this issue continues; proponents call it a common sense reform.
Environmentalists again hold mixed feelings about this idea.
Some environmentalists would prefer a new state or federal program
dealing directly with hardrock abandoned mine problems, rather than a
provision that provides exceptions to current law.333 As a model,
environmentalists would use the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act
("SMCRA"), 334 which deals only with abandoned coal mines. SMCRA
establishes a tax on all active coal mines that is then used to finance
remediation and clean up of abandoned sites.335 In addition, SMCRA
precipitated reforms in
the coal mining industry that observers "widely
336
regarded as positive.
Some environmentalists fear that the GSP would exempt third parties
from liability forever and would cost taxpayers millions. Supporters argue
that the GSP's current and past versions would not permit such results.
However, environmentalists point to a recent consent decree between
Colorado and the Sunnyside Gold Corporation as proof that these ideas are
liability limiting measures.
4. Larry Perino and Sunnyside Gold Mining Company
Larry Perino works as the reclamation manager for the Sunnyside Gold
Mine Company
("Sunnyside"), which is a subsidiary of Echo Bay Mining
331
Company.
Perino has lived his entire life, other than his college years,
327. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASs'N, supra note 57, at 8. See also Telephone
Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
328. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 57, at 8
329. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
330. Id.
331. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 17.
332. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
333. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, supra note 81.

334. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
335. See id. §§ 1231(c)(1), 1232(a).
336. Robert J.Uram, Prospectsfor Mining Law Reform, 12

NAT. RESOURCES

& ENV'T

191, 193 (1998).

337. Echo Bay Mining Company leased Summitville, Colorado, land when Galactic
Resources, the subleasing operator, released pollution that contaminated the site. Echo Bay
sued Colorado claiming that the state's failure to regulate Galactic Resources led to a
diminution of Echo Bay's property values. The reviewing court dismissed the suit based on
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in Silverton, Colorado. He received a civil engineering degree from the
University of Colorado at Boulder and paid his college tuition by working
in Silverton mines.338 Perino now oversees a unique consent decree's
implementation that will eventually release Sunnyside from liability under
the CWA.
During the late 1980's, "Sunnyside produced more than 800 tons of
ore a day., 339 In 1991, when the load paid out, Sunnyside closed.
Sunnyside considered retiring its discharge permit under the CWA.
Therefore, Sunnyside proposed a variety of measures that would end its
liability from its mining operations. However, the Division, the state
agency that oversees active mining permits, rejected Sunnyside's proposal
to retire its discharge permit. Sunnyside then sued the agency, seeking
declaratory judgment on its permit's retirement application. The case
never went to court.
Colorado and Sunnyside signed a consent decree requiring Sunnyside
to perform a variety of remediation measures in order to relieve it of its
liability and discharge permit. 340 To improve the Animas River's water
quality, the remediation measures require work on the actual Sunnyside
mining site. Additionally, Sunnyside agreed to remediate non-Sunnyside
mines in the surrounding area. 34' In total, the remediation work will likely
exceed $22 million.
Bill Simon called this agreement "a precedent nationwide."3 4 2 Simon
believes that third-party clean ups remain integral to abandoned mine
reclamation. 4 Environmentalists warn that limiting Sunnyside's liability
creates "[a] huge experiment."3 44 Environmentalists worry that if anything
goes wrong thirty years from now, taxpayers will have to pay for the clean
up. 34 5 Long-term considerations aside, the consent decree with Sunnyside
constitutes an immediate improvement in water quality throughout the
Upper Animas basin. Perino remains proud of the remediation work he
and Sunnyside conduct in the basin. Likewise, the Stakeholders Group
appreciates having Sunnyside participate in the CBC effort.
The
Stakeholders Group hopes to continue this collaboration in the future.346

sovereign immunity grounds. See generally Summitville Story, supra note 76.
338. Telephone Interview with Larry Perino, Reclamation Manager for Sunnyside Gold
Mine Company (Apr. 16, 1999).
339. Fetchenhier, supra note 19, at 82.
340. See Christopher G. Hayes & William C. Robb, Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement
Under the Clean Water Act-The Sunnyside Experience, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 95,
98-99.
341. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 19. This approach is called
pollution trading. Pollution trading allows a discharger to get some regulatory relief at their
own site in exchange for cleaning up sites where the discharger has no legal liability. See
id. at 18.
342. Ray Ring, A Radical Approach to Mine Reclamation, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan.
19, 1998, at B2.
343. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
344. See Ring, supra note 342, at B2.
345. See id.
346. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
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5. Carol Russell and the Environmental Protection Agency
Carol Russell works as the EPA's main liaison with the Stakeholders

Group. Russell has a lot of experience with rural western communities and
with their mining problems. After growing up on Colorado's Western
Slope near Silverton, Russell earned undergraduate degrees in both biology
and geology, as well as a masters degree in environmental policy. "

Following her education, Russell worked as a consultant for a mining
company in Nevada. Russell also worked for Colorado on mining
problems and for the State of Arizona on nonpoint source pollution

problems.34
Currently, Russell works as the EPA's team leader for the Animas
River. In this capacity, she attempts to coordinate all of EPA's regulatory
activities in the Animas River basin.349 In addition, she co-chairs the
EPA's National Hardrock Mining Framework, which is a project the EPA
created to coordinate its regulatory activities under the thirty-seven
different laws that deal with mining. The Animas River project serves as a
pilot for this coordinating effort.35 °
Russell, the self-proclaimed cheerleader for the Stakeholders Group,
believes the only way to protect the environment is for citizens to take

personal responsibility for its maintenance and improvement. She believes
that the Stakeholders Group, while not perfect, made some noteworthy
progress. 311 While the EPA has signaled its support for community-based
approaches, Russell suggests that EPA's patience is running thin.
Over the last few years, the EPA pushed the concept of communitybased environmental protection as a way to solve difficult environmental
problems. 352 Through this program, the EPA "integrates environmental

347. Russell grew up in Montrose and Durango. She received her biology degree from
the University of Oregon and her geology degree from Purdue University. She earned her
masters degree in environmental policy, focusing on abandoned mine problems, from the
University of Denver. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader
for Environmental Protection Agency (May 3, 1999).
348. Russell worked on remediating mines for the Colorado Division of Minerals and
Geology. In Arizona, she headed an aquifer protection program and the state's nonpoint
source program. Id.
349. These regulatory activities include, but are not limited to: oversight of the proposed
Animas-La Plata Dam project; regulation of various gravel mining activities; regulation of
agricultural pesticide; regulation of coal bed methane mining; and mediation between the
government and Indian tribes. Id.
350. Id.
351. Russell points to several achievements: the community's empowerment; the increase
in the local community's involvement in the regulatory process; the increased information
sharing between private and governmental actors; and the Forest Service's and Bureau of
Land Management's reluctant recognition that they need to participate in the remediation
efforts in the basin because they could be held liable for pollution originating from their
land. Id.
352. Six main principles create the community-based environmental protection program.
These include: "(1) [flocus[ing] on [g]eographic [a]rea; (2) [w]ork[ing] [c]ollaboratively
with [s]takeholders; (3) [p]rotecting and [r]estor[ing] [q]uality of [a]ir, [wiater, [l]and, and
[hliving [riesources in a [pllace as a [wlhole; (4) [i]ntegrat[ing] [e]nvironmental, [e]conomic
and [slocial [o]bjectives; (5) [tiake [aiction [u]sing [m]ost [aippropriate [t]ools; (6)
[u]se[ing] [aldaptive [m]anagement." See United States Environmental Protection Agency,
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management with human needs, considers long-term ecosystem health[,]

and highlights the positive correlations between economic prosperity and
environmental well-being." 353 The EPA implements this agenda through
appropriations for various programs that support community-based
environmental protection.
For the first few years of the Stakeholders Group's existence, its
funding relied on the EPA's Rocky Mining Headwaters Mine Waste
Initiative. However, for the last three years, EPA reduced the Mine Waste

Initiative's funding from approximately $1.5 million to less than $100
thousand dollars. In addition, this program lacks a statutory basis;
therefore, long-term funding from this source remains uncertain.354 Russell
attributes the decline in funding to concerns held by the upper levels of
management in EPA that community-based groups do not actually achieve
on-the-ground success.355
The EPA's section 319 nonpoint program 35 6 also constitutes a key

funding source for the Stakeholders Group. For 1999, the Stakeholders
Group received thirty-five percent of Colorado's section 319 grant money
from the EPA.
The approximately $450 thousand went directly to
remediation projects.357 In addition, section 319 funding has doubled over
the last three years.35 8
These developments intimate that EPA will not perpetually fund
watershed initiatives through the section 319 program because local
funding is more appropriate.35 9 While the EPA does not want the
Stakeholders Group to fail, it does want someone else to pick up the bill. 3"
Russell explains that states and individuals need to take responsibility for
old mining pollution.361
However, not many local sources of funding exist. The Stakeholders

Community-Based Environmental Protection, About CBEP (last modified Sept. 30, 1998)
< http://yosemite.epa.gov/osec/osechome.nsf/All/AboutCBEP/>.
353. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Community-Based Environmental
Protection (last modified Dec. 21, 1999) < http://www.epa.gov/ecocommunity/>.
354. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 16.
355. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
356. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(b)(2)(E), 1329(h), 1329(i) (1994). Under section 319 of the
Clean Water Act, states, territories, and tribes can receive grants to support a wide variety
of activities including: technical assistance; financial assistance; education; training;
technology transfer; demonstration projects; and monitoring to assess the success of specific
nonpoint source implementation projects. The division actually receives the section 319
grants on behalf of the Stakeholders Group because the group is not a legal entity.
Meanwhile, the San Juan County RC&D actually holds the money for the Stakeholders
Group. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
357. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
358. Colorado's section 319 funding has risen from $1 million three years ago to more
than $2 million today. The increase in funding may represent EPA's recognition that total
maximum daily loads could be getting more serious. Id.
359. Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, supra note 278.
360. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
361. Russell points out that Americans wear gold, drive cars, and use computers that
depend on mining. As a result, society benefited from historical mining practices. Thus, in
her view, Americans must contribute to remediating some of the damage caused by mining
in the United States. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
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Group receives some funding from Southwestern Water Conservation
District. Additionally, local volunteers and San Juan County provide some
services. Local sources will provide significantly more of the Stakeholders
Group's funding in the near future. As a result, the Stakeholders Group
must subsist on a sporadic diet of federal, state, and local funding to
survive.

Source of Funding

Used For

US EPA

Administration, Water
Characterization Studies
Assistance with data collection
and site characterization.
Biological Studies, Remediation
Biological Studies, Remediation
Biological Studies, Habitat
Administration, Gauging Stations

Volunteers
US Forest Service
US BLM
CO Dept. of Wildlife
Southwest Water
Conservation District
Mining Corporations

Administration

CO Dept. Public Health
and Environment
San Juan County

Water Characterization Studies

Town of Silverton

In kind services

Office Space

% of
Overall
Budget
25%
20%
20%
20%
5%
5%
Less than
2%
Less than

1%

Less than
1%
Less than
1%

6. Cal Joiner and the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management
Cal Joyner works as the associate forest supervisor for the Forest
Service's ("FS") San Juan-Rio Grande National Forest and as the field
office manager for the Bureau of Land Management's ("BLM") San Juan
Field Office.362 Remarkably, this means Joyner runs both the FS and the
BLM in San Juan County, an unusual melding of jobs resulting from a pilot
project. The project is the FS' and the BLM's attempt to reduce their
activities' redundancies and inefficiencies.
Under Joyner's watch the
Abandoned Mined Land Initiative ("AMLI") will occur in the Upper
Animas basin. The AMLI could either help or frustrate the Stakeholders
Group's progress based on the level of coordination these efforts achieve.
Cal Joyner, a Southern California native, received his masters degree
in watershed management from Humbolt State University. In 1980, in
Oregon, Joyner entered the FS as a hydrologist. He also worked as a
362. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, Associate Forest Supervisor for the San JuanRio Grande National Forest and San Juan Field Office Manager for the United States
Bureau of Land Management (Apr. 26, 1999).
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district ranger in Montana's Bitteroot National Forest. Joyner came to the
FS in San Juan County in 1995.363
Since 1995, Joyner has overseen San Juan County's Service First

program, which attempts to eliminate redundancies in FS and BLM
work. 3' These agencies chose San Juan County as one of two pilot sites
for this program. The program's mission creates "one stop shopping" for
the public-one permit structure for common activities including, but not
limited to, timber cutting permits for firewood and for Christmas trees.365
The agencies are not merging; they maintain separate budgets and staffs. 366
But, where necessary or appropriate, the program allows them to share
personnel and data.367 So far, the program saved an estimated $1 million at
the two pilot sites. 368 This new emphasis on coordination between the FS

and BLM remains important in the AMD context.
Soon after Joyner's arrival in San Juan County, the EPA and the

Stakeholders Group began talking to the BLM, the FS, and the other land
management agencies about their responsibilities in cleaning up the AMD

in the basin.369 Given that very few major sources of AMD are on federal

land, the federal agencies initially refused to believe that they could be
responsible for clean up. 370 However, after a slow discussion
education process, the groups convinced the FS and the BLM that
could be held liable for AMD waste occurring on private lands

held
and
they
that

negatively affects federal lands. 37' In San Juan County in 1995, the EPA
worked with BLM and FS to produce general discharge permits for all
their sites. EPA's Carol Russell claims that the fear of liability prompted
the FS and the BLM to request the AMLI from Congress.372
Also in 1995, the United States Department of Interior chose the Upper

363. Id.
364. Id. The Trading Post Program, now called Service First, began as an inter-agency
initiative between the FS and BLM. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Memorandum of Understanding, Feb. 14, 1997, between the United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service-Department of Interior Bureau of Land
Management, No. 95-MOU-056 (as amended).
367. Id.
368. See Bureau of Land Management, Cutting Red Tape and Improving Service: The
2000)
(visited
Feb.
11,
Post
Initiative
Trading
< http://www.lmOO05.blm.gov/nhp/NPR/ric/tp-initiative.html >.
369. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
370. Only two or three major AMD sources exist on public lands in the Upper Animas
basin. Most of the mining sites on private land today were obtained by patent from the
federal government. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River
Stakeholders Group (Apr. 26, 1999).
371. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 362. Under CWA, federal land
management activities must ensure that chemicals discharged from public lands do not
degrade water quality. Id. If pollution from private land contaminates public land, the
federal agencies could be held liable for that discharge of pollutants even though it does not
originate on public lands. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal
Lands 11: Water Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 61 (1993). At the very
least, a citizen suit could force the FS and BLM to cleanup their lands at an accelerated
pace. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 362.
372. Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277. Russell also credits the Stakeholders
Group for encouraging the FS and the BLM to obtain funding for the AML program. Id.
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Animas basin as one of two pilot sites for a demonstration project under
AMLI.3 73 The AMLI sought "to provide information for use around the
nation on the effects of acid mine drainage and the remediation of mining
sites. '' 74 However, the AMLI designation constituted "a top-down action
without consultation with the Stakeholders Group and many of the projects
375
are being developed without consultation with the Stakeholders Group."
Moreover, some Stakeholders Group members worried that AMLI-pursued
goals would conflict with the Stakeholders Group's efforts.376 Others
suggested that the FS and the BLM should share more of AMLI's funding
with the Stakeholders Group to help facilitate a comprehensive solution.377
According to the program's mandates, the AMLI can use its money on
private sites if it demonstrates that those sites clearly affect public lands;
however, this process requires local landowners' cooperation, which is just
beginning. 78 Meanwhile, the FS and the BLM attempt to conduct
successful remediation projects on public lands to show private landowners
the results and to foster trust between the landowners and the agencies.379
While the AMLI remains potentially useful and essential to any basin clean
up, political realities undermine the AMLI's potential.
380
Joyner noted that AMLI's appropriations exist only for five years.
Currently, the initiative receives nearly $1.6 million per year. However,
when the original appropriation ends in 2002, that number could sink
below a few hundred thousand dollars.38 ' While the FS and the BLM will
always cooperate in the Upper Animas basin's mining clean up, they will
loose efficacy with fewer resources. 2
The AMLI's short-term focus results from political realities and federal
budgeting constraints. Agency officials want instant results, without which
they will move on to other, arguably more pressing environmental
problems.3 3 In addition, the FS itself has tremendous forest maintenance
needs that will compete with AMLI. With the political motivation to
balance the federal budget and to create a smaller federal government,
Joyner does not see the AMLI competing well with public education,

373.

See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)

<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foaOl.htm>;
FOR ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 129, at 36.

see also

COLORADO CTR.

374. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Anitas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa0l.htm >.
375. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Upper Animas River Watershed
Stakeholders
Group
(last
updated
Mar.
1999)
< http://www.epa.gov/region08/crosslcbep/fact/ani.html >.
376. Id.
377. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
378. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370. BLM actually created a
policy that allows them to spend their AMLI money on private sites that impact federal
land. While the FS does not have a similar policy, Joyner has committed the FS to this
same kind of action. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
379. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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Medicare, or social security.384
While the Stakeholders Group intends to continue working in the basin
on mining clean up for twenty years or more, 38 5 the federal agencies have a
much shorter outlook. This disjunction in perspectives and goals will make

a comprehensive, long-term, solution difficult to reach for the Upper
Animas basin. Nevertheless, Joyner remains committed to working with
the Stakeholders Group. In fact, he has referred to the Stakeholders Group
3 86
as "perhaps the best example of civic environmentalism in the country.
D. CURRENT GOALS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

The Stakeholders Group's current goal remains to complete the
proposed water quality standards for the Upper Animas River by the 2001
deadline. 3" To this end, the Stakeholders Group has nearly fifty individual
site characterization studies currently in progress.388 In addition, the

Stakeholders Group currently conducts a basin-wide biomonitoring

program.389

The Stakeholders Group planned three major remediation projects for
1999: the Animas Mine Waste Control Project; 3 the Cement Creek Mine

Waste Control Project; 391 and the Mine Infiltration Identification and
Control Project. 2 In addition, the Stakeholders Group seeks to coordinate
at least two more remediation projects on private land.393 Money for these
projects comes from the EPA's section 319 nonpoint source pollution
grants.

Next, the Stakeholders Group plans to develop a framework for TMDL
regulation in the basin. 395 The TMDL developing process could constitute
the most challenging hurdle the Stakeholders Group has dealt with.
However, Simon does not worry about the TMDL impacts in the Upper

Animas basin. Simon claims that since natural or unavoidable background
384. Id.
385. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370.
386. Id.
387. This study will be used by the Commission to set use designation standards.
388. Survey Questions for the Watershed Source Book Revision-Long Form, Data
Concerning Animas River Stakeholders Group, at No. 38(d) (on file with Natural Resources
Law Center, University of Colorado).
389. Id. at No. 38(d).
390. This project will focus on Carbon Lakes' hydrologic controls, which are controls of
water flowing into mines. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
391. This project give money to three to six private landowners to work on hydrologic
controls. Id.
392. This project works on hydrologic controls in a unique way to avoid liability under
the CWA. These projects attempt to intercept water infiltration before it hits abandoned
mines to prevent AMD production. In this way, the remediation project does not directly
work on the mine portal, which would create liability under the CWA. Id.
393. Steve Fearn's Silver Wing Company and Salem Minerals work on mine drainage
treatment at two separate sites with EPA section 319 money. Id.
394. First, the section 319 money goes to the Division. The Division, through grants,

chooses recipients. When the Stakeholders Group receives money from the Division, the
San Juan County RC&D actually holds the money for the Stakeholders Group. Id.

395. Id.
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contamination conditions remain exempt from the load reduction side,
TMDLs may not create as difficult a problem as imagined. 39 In addition,
the EPA "is in love with" the community-based watershed approach in the
TMDL context because the reforms required to achieve the TMDLs remain
politically difficult to implement without local support.397 Therefore, EPA
will likely support whatever standards the Stakeholders Group creates.
RECOMMENDATIONS
"Everything simple is wrong. Everything complex is useless. 398
"[A] general law should be enacted under which a number of persons
would be able to organize and settle on irrigabledistricts,
and establish their own rules and regulations
for the use of the water and subdivision of the lands,
but in obedience to the generalprovisions of the law. ,99
VI.

The implementation of any of the following recommendations might
facilitate a more successful venture for the Stakeholders Group. First,
Colorado needs to adopt legislation similar to the State of Oregon's
legislation that finances and supports the creation and the continuation of
community-based watershed initiatives. Considering that Colorado is one
of the nation's most politically conservative states,4 °° passing such a bill
will be difficult. In fact, a similar bill failed in the 1998 legislative
session.40 '
However, many conservatives hold libertarian or small government
sympathies that may ally them with the community-based watershed
movement. Lobbyists must argue that initiatives like the Stakeholders
Group have the potential to promote democracy and to produce equitable
solutions to serious environmental problems. Without more direct state
support of watershed initiatives in Colorado, average citizens will continue
to feel alienated from the current system of highly litigious water
management.4 °2
Second, Congress and many of the western states need to adopt a

396. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
397. Telephone Interview with Doug Kenney, Research Associate for Natural Resources
Law Center (Apr. 7, 1999).
398. Preface, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND
HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at xi (quoting Paul Valeri).
399. POWELL, supra note 148, at 39.
400. Republicans control both houses of Colorado's legislature. Likewise, the newly
elected governor is republican. Both United States Senators and the majority of United
States Representatives vote republican. Recent conservative ballot initiatives originated in
the state.
401. See generally H.B. 1288, 61S" Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998).
402. Colorado adjudicates water rights in court, while all other states administer water
rights through executive agencies. In addition, by one estimate, nearly half of the water
lawyers in the country live in Colorado. This system of regulating water rights may
contribute to a feeling of disempowerment among average citizens who are otherwise
interested in water resource management. Telephone Interview with Charles F. Wilkinson,
Law Professor at University of Colorado (Apr. 22, 1999).
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comprehensive federal and state program to deal with abandoned mines on
private and public lands. A program modeled after the SMCRA could tax
mining operations to finance reclamation of abandoned mining sites. This
reform would require modification of the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872.
Prior attempts to reform this Act have proven unsuccessful. However,
recent developments suggest reform may be gaining momentum.4 °3 Any
program addressing abandoned mines should have a preference for
community-based solutions created from collaborative forums. In addition,
this law should attempt to minimize the fragmentation of management
authority over lands affected by abandoned mines by encouraging or by
requiring interagency cooperation.
Third, the Forest Service and BLM in San Juan County should
continue to increase their coordination with the Stakeholders Group. In
addition, funding for the AMLI program should extend beyond five years.
The FS and the BLM should recognize that problems like AMD cannot be
solved quickly. Rather, the agencies must make long-term commitments to
solving these problems. The FS should formally adopt a policy similar to
BLM's that allows its AMLI money to be used on private land. Both
agencies should then proactively use this policy to benefit all stakeholders
in the area rather than limiting their efforts to their respective bureaucratic
domains. Similarly, the FS and BLM should take more affirmative actions
to encourage small landowners with abandoned mines on their lands to
participate in the process. Because these landowners remain the key to
cleaning up the basin, they should participate throughout the process.
Last, Congress should adopt the good samaritan provision, which
would amend the CWA to exempt third parties from liability for
voluntarily cleaning up abandoned mine sites. Congress should adopt a
law that includes strong oversight provisions and reasonable limitations on
liability for groups like the Stakeholders Group. The theoretical possibility
that the state or the EPA can regulate abandoned mines on innocent
landowners' properties is insufficient. In reality, no regulation or clean up
occurs at these sites. The good samaritan provision would empower third
parties to tackle this challenge.
Accompanying this relaxation of liability, two actions must occur.
First, the state and federal governments should diligently pursue the
individuals or the corporations responsible for the pollution occurring at
the abandoned mines. When the government finds the PRPs, it should
require them to pay for as much of the remediation as equity allows.
Second, Congress should strengthen the CWA to require mandatory
403. The Western Mining Action Center recently began challenging mining claims based
on a provision in the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872 that only allows a minimal amount of
acres for mill sites on mining claims. In the past, this limitation on mill site claims had
essentially been ignored. However, the Department of Interior recently agreed with the
Western Mining Action Center's interpretation of the Act to limit mill sites. This
interpretation, if upheld in court, could mean that the Hardrock Mining Act is insufficient to
accommodate the large amounts of mill site area that are needed to run a modern mine. If
this is the case, then even the mining companies will be calling for reform. Telephone
Interview with Roger Flynn, Executive Director and Managing Attorney for Western
Mining Action Center (Mar. 14, 1999).
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regulation of nonpoint source pollution. Despite Congress' recognition of
the importance of regulating these sources, the CWA remains impotent in
this regard.
VII.

CONCLUSION

"[W]ithout the torment of the ideal,
there is little hope for significant and enduring change.
"In general, this effort is viewed favorably as a pragmatic mechanism
for integratingnational regulatory goals
within a grassroots watershed managementframework.
The approachhas potential applicationto many other sites throughout
the West,
by abandonedmines. "405
burdened
those
particularly
The community-based watershed movement has emerged from a sea of
paradoxes in the American West. While the West remains a bastion of
rugged individualism, the West was built and sustained by cooperation
among neighbors and friends. 4°6 Though a staunch anti-government
contingent exists in the West, many rural ranchers and farmers in the
region depend on state and federal subsidies for their livelihood.4 °7
Mining, too, began as an individualist's enterprise, but now consists of
multinational corporations dependent on whole communities to operate.
The Upper Animas basin's AMD problems create a paradox. The
pollution that remains belongs to people long since gone. Yet, people
singled out for liability under the current regulatory structure are usually
called "innocent landowners." In fact, almost everyone in the United
States shares some responsibility for mining pollution. Nearly everyone
drives a car or uses a computer that contains some mined metals. Others
continue to inherit wealth derived from the exploitation of minerals from
public lands. Colorado, itself, with its state seal emblazoned with a
miner's pick and shovel, was built on mining. Along with accepting the
benefits, local, state, and federal actors must accept their appropriate
degree of responsibility for the problems created by unregulated mining.
To see local, state, and federal entities taking responsibility for the
mining pollution in the Upper Animas basin is refreshing and inspiring.
The Stakeholders Group disproves those who claim that community-based
groups never accomplish anything. At the same time, perhaps its greatest
challenges lie ahead.
It is refreshing and inspiring to see local, state, and federal entities
taking responsibility for the mining pollution in the upper Animas basin.
The Stakeholders Group is disproving those who claim that community404. FRANK POMMERSHIEM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 135 (1995).
405. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 15.
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based watershed groups are ineffective. At the same time, perhaps its
greatest challenges lie ahead. If the Stakeholders Group fails, it may not
be clear why. It could fail from lack of effort, though that is unlikely.
More likely, it could fail due to institutional factors, such as lack of
funding or insufficient governmental coordination. However, if groups
like the Stakeholders Group can produce solutions in a democratic manner,
then Congress, the legislature, and government agencies should give them
every opportunity to succeed while retaining mechanisms to ensure
accountability.
Democratic values and civic participation reverberate with people's
deepest intuitions of fairness. The Stakeholders Group is striving for
fairness and equity. While it has the wind at its back, it should be given
every opportunity to succeed, remembering that without the risk of failure,
success is never possible.

